issue that required a trial for its resolution regarding the good
faith ground. This was so because, accepting the existence and
scope of the duty as put forward by the appellants, on the undisputed facts the duty would not give rise to a remedy in the circumstances. Secondly, the motion judge did not assume a limited
scope of the duty, leaving the prospect that a broader scope
might be established at trial. His assumption was based on the
precise scope of the duty asserted by the appellants.
 There was no dispute that Harry did not disclose the
Loan Agreement. However, the motion judge concluded that the
duty of honesty and good faith alleged, even if established,
would not require the disclosure of the Loan Agreement in the
context of the operation of the Shotgun Provision. I agree. There
was therefore no genuine issue for trial on the question of
whether Harry was obliged to disclose the terms of the Loan
Agreement (the issue with respect to which the motion judge’s
assumption was made).
 Finally, it cannot be said in the circumstances of this case
that deciding the summary judgment motion on the basis of
assumed facts was contrary to this court’s direction that on a
Rule 20 motion, all of the evidence that could be led at trial
should be before the court, as was the case, for example, in
Société Générale. Here, examinations for discovery and production had been completed. In addition, the parties had the benefit
of cross-examination on the affidavits filed in connection with
the summary judgment motion. The motion judge had a full and
complete record before him.
(d) The motion judge did not err in weighing evidence and
 I am not satisfied that the motion judge erred by engaging in an exercise of weighing the evidence and drawing inferences of the type prohibited on motions for summary judgment.
Leaving aside the facts underpinning the appellants’ allegation
of a duty of honesty and good faith — which were assumed at
their highest, in favour of the appellants — the material facts in
the action were not in dispute.
 The appellants rely heavily on the well-accepted principle
that causes of action involving allegations of fiduciary duties,
good faith, oppression and misrepresentation are individually
fact-laden. In determining whether, on the specific facts, the
duty has been breached, they contend, “there is no substitute . . .
for a meticulous examination of the facts”: Hodgkinson v.
Simms,  3 S.C.R. 377,  S.C.J. No. 84, at pp. 413-14
S.C.R. Here, however, the motion judge had a full and complete