For these reasons, I conclude that territorial limit of the policy does, by
virtue of the explicit language of the Act and the Regulation, apply to limit
uninsured motor vehicle coverage mandated by s. 265(1) of the Act.
 Uninsured automobile coverage again came under scrutiny by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Shipman v. Dominion of
Canada General Insurance Co. (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 144, 
O.J. No. 4160 (C.A.). In that case, the plaintiff and her daughter
were struck by a vehicle, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff and
the death of her daughter. The vehicle that hit them had been
driven by the at-fault driver without the consent of the owner. At
issue was whether the uninsured automobile provisions of the
owner’s policy were available to the plaintiff or whether her
claim was, instead, properly against the fund.
 Gouge J.A., speaking for the court, held that the Act, the
Regulation and the policy must all be considered in determining
whether coverage applied. At paras. 7-11, he said this:
The relevant part of s. 1.8.2 is as follows:
1.8.2. Excluded Drivers and Driving Without Permission
— Except for certain Accident Benefits coverage, there is no coverage
(including coverage for occupants) under this policy if the automobile is
used or operated by a person in possession of the automobile without
the owner’s consent . . .
The Fund agrees that the position of the motion judge cannot be sustained. It acknowledges that s. 265 of the Act, Regulation 676 and, inter
alia, the exclusion provisions of the Dominion policy (including s. 1.8.2)
must be read together to determine if the plaintiff is entitled to coverage
under the Dominion policy. However, it says that s. 10 of Regulation 676
gives s. 1.8.2 of the policy effect only “so far as applicable” and as a result,
the exclusion only applies to eliminate coverage for occupants.
In our view, the respondent was correct to concede that the motion judge
erred in finding that the question before him must be answered without
reference to the Regulation or the exclusion provision in the Dominion
policy. The jurisprudence of this court has made clear that the Act, the Regulation and inter alia the exclusion provisions of the policy must all be considered in answering a question like the one in this case. See, for example,
Ortiz v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 130
Moreover, we see no basis for rewriting the scope of s. 1.8.2 of the Dominion policy to limit its exclusionary effect only to occupants. The language
of the exclusion says exactly the opposite. Since there is no difficulty in
this case in fully applying the exclusion clause as written, there is no basis
to decline to do so based on the opening words of s. 10 of Regulation 672.
The exclusion clause therefore excludes coverage for the plaintiff under
the Dominion policy. This leaves her to resort to the Fund.
 The chain of reasoning of the court is simple. Section 265(1)
of the Act mandates the inclusion of uninsured automobile