Although the agreement provided that the procedures
would be “similar to court procedure where possible” and that
“witnesses would be sworn . . . and would be subject to cross-examination and re-examination”, I cannot conclude that the
process that was followed contravened the agreement and the
Arbitration Act for the following reasons: the arbitrator determined the process, in consultation with the parties’ counsel, as
provided for in the agreement; the parties agreed to the procedure; the appellant refused to alter the procedure when it was
suggested by the arbitrator and when the respondent provided
a severable offer; and the agreement does not clearly mandate
the utilization of a court-like hearing, but instead uses the language of “similar to court procedure where possible”.
 If one were to accept the appellant’s interpretation that
the mediation/arbitration agreement required sworn testimony
and cross-examination, the parties’ agreement to proceed by way
of final offer selection constitutes, at most, an amendment to
their agreement. If it is an amendment to a family arbitration
agreement, it did not comply with the technical requirements in
that it was neither signed by the parties nor witnessed (Family
Law Act, ss. 55(1) and 59.1(1)).
 It would, in my opinion, be patently unfair to the
respondent to allow the appeal solely on the basis of this technicality. There is no suggestion of unequal bargaining power or
duress, nor is there any suggestion that the appellant did not
understand what he was agreeing to. The appellant had legal
counsel. The appellant reiterated his support for the process on
several occasions. It was the appellant, not the respondent, who
took the position that the process could not be altered.
 I agree with the appellant that the parties cannot confer
legitimacy on a process that is contrary to the law by way of
agreement. However, for the reasons I have expressed elsewhere
in this decision, the parties did not agree to a process that was
contrary to the law when they agreed to the process that was
followed in this case.
The adequacy of the reasons
 The appellant contends that the arbitrator’s reasons
were inadequate. He describes the arbitrator’s reasons as merely
 Section 38 of the Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration award shall state the reasons on which the award is
based. The parties agreed, through their counsel, that the arbitrator would provide brief reasons.