not by its mere possession. Mulder’s participation in the incident
leading to those injuries was apparently limited to his being the
driver of the car from which his two friends were doing the
shooting, and to possessing a weapon.
 Ms. Nelson analogizes Mulder’s alleged acts to those of
the son in Hartup v. BCAA Insurance Corp.,  B.C.J. No.
1520, 2002 CarswellBC 1560 (S.C.), who had fired a pellet gun
in his parents’ residence, thereby injuring a bystander, and who
was subsequently convicted of careless storage of a firearm. The
court reasoned that the injuries were caused by the discharge of
the firearm, not its storage, and accordingly held that the exclusion clause did not apply.
 The situation in Hartup is distinguishable from the present case. In Hartup, not only did the offence of which the
defendant was convicted not directly cause the injury, but the
entire incident surrounding the firing of the weapon was said to
be a careless rather than an intentional act. In the court’s view,
at para. 21, “[t]he real claim against the defendants is based on
negligence”. By contrast, Mulder’s criminal offence is one of
intention — there is no suggestion that his possession of a dangerous weapon was accidental — and the allegation that he
engaged in harmful conduct by operating a vehicle from which
his friends were shooting pellet guns amounts to a claim of participation in an intentional tort. His actions are alleged to have
been part and parcel of the criminal and intentional conduct of
his two friends, making the damages claimed by Kadin Kendall
“claims arising from . . . bodily injury . . . caused by any intentional or criminal act”.
 I would accordingly grant the declaration sought with
respect to Mulder, but would dismiss the request for a declaration with respect to Shoup and Moar. The applicant has no duty
to defend the claim against Mulder in the main action as that
claim falls within the exclusion clause. On the other hand, the
applicant is obliged under the terms of the insurance policy to
defend the claims brought against Shoup and Moar in the main
action, as those claims are separate from the claims against
Mulder and do not fall within the exclusion clause.
 The respondents Shoup and Moar will have their costs
against the applicant on a partial indemnity scale. No costs are
awarded for or against the respondent Mulder. I have already
received a bill of costs from counsel for Shoup. Counsel for
Moar shall submit a bill of costs within ten days of the date of