(1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 481,  O.J. No. 3556 (C.A.), where Fin-
layson J.A. stated, at p. 491 O.R.:
Considering that a corporation is an inanimate piece of legal machinery
incapable of thought or action, the court can only determine its legal liability
by assessing the conduct of those who caused the company to act in the way
that it did. This does not mean, however, that if the actions of the directing
minds are found wanting, that personal liability will flow through the corpo-
ration to those who caused it to act as it did. To hold the directors of Peoples
personally liable, there must be some activity on their part that takes them
out of the role of directing minds of the corporation. In this case, there are
no such allegations.
 The motion judge also found that the claims against
Ms. Patterson were bald allegations with no factual basis and
that the proposed pleading did not specify why she was being
sued as an individual separately from the corporations. He concluded by saying that, if evidence is disclosed in the examinations for discovery and production of documents that would
found the claims he had denied, then the plaintiffs could renew
their motion to add Ms. Patterson.
 The motion judge then assessed the viability of each of
the three causes of action proposed against her. Dealing first
with the claim against Ms. Patterson for conspiracy to injure,
the motion judge found that all of the components of that cause
of action were properly pleaded against her in para. 98 of the
proposed amended statement of claim. In that paragraph, it is
asserted that some of the defendants, including Ms. Patterson,
acted in concert to deprive the plaintiffs of their profits. The
motion judge concluded that “[ i]f such is proven, it naturally follows that if the conduct is found to be unlawful, and such deprivation is proved, the defendants would have known that injury
to the plaintiffs would be the natural result”.
 Nevertheless, although the conspiracy claim was sufficiently pleaded and particularized, the motion judge would not
allow that claim to be added against Ms. Patterson because of
the ruling he had already made that there was an insufficient
factual basis to ground any of the claims against her in her personal capacity.
 The second claim was for breach of fiduciary duty. The
motion judge found that the proposed amended claim did not
plead facts that would give rise to a fiduciary duty between
Ms. Patterson, as an employee of Mr. Way or as a director and
officer of PPC and Jamesway, and the plaintiffs.
 The third claim was for inducing breach of contract, the
contract being the joint venture. After setting out the elements
of the tort, the motion judge concluded that the pleading was
adequate to sustain the claim against Ms. Patterson for inducing