breach of contract, and that “[w]hile it lacked some particulars,
it was sufficient to allow her to plead to it if that had been
necessary”. However, because he had found that there was an
insufficient factual basis to allow Ms. Patterson to be sued in her
personal capacity for any cause of action, the motion to add
the claim against her for inducing breach of contract was also
 While the motion judge and plaintiffs do not specify which
subrule they are relying on, in my view, rule 5.03(4) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 is the most applicable
in the circumstances, together with rule 26.01:
26.01 On motion at any stage of an action the court shall grant leave to
amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result
that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.
. . . . .
5.03(4) The court may order that any person who ought to have been
joined as a party or whose presence as a party is necessary to enable the
court to adjudicate effectively and completely on the issues in the proceeding
shall be added as a party.
 The motion judge directed himself in his introduction to
the reasons that “[ i]n accordance with the ruling of the Ontario
Court of Appeal . . . amendments to add parties should be presumptively approved, unless there is abuse of the court process
or non-compensable prejudice”.
 There is neither an allegation of prejudice nor a limitation period issue here, and the action is at an early stage. The
plaintiffs could commence a new action against the proposed
defendants and then seek to join it with the existing action.
The procedure of adding parties to the existing action circumvents the costly and time-consuming process involved in that
 Because this is a motion to amend pleadings, the allegations in the pleading are taken to be true and provable. The only
issue, therefore, is whether the allegations, as pleaded, plead all
of the necessary components of an identifiable cause of action.
 In my view, having found that the causes of action for
conspiracy to injure and inducing breach of contract were sufficiently pleaded against Ms. Patterson, the motion judge erred by
not allowing her to be joined as a defendant in respect of those
two causes of action.
 The motion judge referred to the following statement by
Finlayson J.A. in ScotiaMcLeod, affirmed by this court in
Normart Management Ltd. v. West Hill Redevelopment Co.
(1998), 37 O.R. (3d) 97,  O.J. No. 391 (C.A.), at p. 102 O.R.: