It is well established that the directing minds of corporations cannot be
held civilly liable for the actions of the corporations they control and direct
unless there is some conduct on the part of those directing minds that is
either tortious in itself or exhibits a separate identity or interest from that
of the corporations such as to make the acts or conduct complained of those of
the directing minds.
 The fact that corporate actors can be separately liable if
they have engaged in tortious conduct, even in the course of
their duty, was also confirmed by this court in ADGA Systems
International Ltd. v. Valcom Ltd. (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 101, 
O.J. No. 27 (C.A.), at p. 112-13 O.R.
 At para. 98, the motion judge made the following state-
In the case at bar, the factual foundation for the tort of conspiracy, the
claim for breach of fiduciary duty and inducing breach of contract, as
pleaded, is identical to that which underlies the allegations for breach of
the [joint venture agreement] and the Shareholders Agreements. The
damages alleged in all cases are the same. The allegations made against
Ms. Patterson are bald allegations with no factual basis to found a claim
against her in law.
 With respect to the motion judge, in this passage he has
not acknowledged that in this case there is a clear pleading of
fraudulent conduct by Ms. Patterson, which is detailed to the
same extent as the claims against other defendants. This brings
the case squarely within the type of conduct where a claim
against the directing mind is not barred.
 The motion judge also erred in suggesting that there must
be evidence to sustain such a claim. It may be that because there
was such an abundance of evidence already developed in the
record in this matter, the motion judge expected sworn or docu-
mentary evidence to support the proposed new pleadings. How-
ever, that is not a requirement on a motion to add a party
(subject to other considerations, such as prejudice or abuse of
process). As Moldaver J.A. stated in Andersen Consulting Ltd. v.
Canada (Attorney General),  O.J. No. 3576, 150 O.A.C. 177
(C.A.), at para. 34: “[T]he law is clear that unless the facts
alleged are based on assumptive or speculative conclusions that
are incapable of proof, they must be accepted as proven and
the court should not look beyond the pleadings to determine
whether the action can proceed.”
 I would therefore allow the appeal with respect to the
addition of Ms. Patterson as a defendant on the two issues of
conspiracy to injure and inducing breach of contract. The plain-
tiffs are not pursuing the claim for breach of fiduciary duty.