broad categories, there is room for the law of constructive trust to develop
and for greater precision to be attained, as time and experience may dictate.
 She then set out “the prerequisites for a constructive
trust based on wrongful conduct”, at para. 45. I omit them
because this appeal does not involve a constructive trust based
on a wrongful act.
(3) The appellant’s view of Soulos
 The appellant argues that Soulos limits the remedy to
the two defined situations of unjust enrichment and wrongful
acts, and otherwise abolished the doctrine of good conscience
constructive trusts as a general source of equitable jurisdiction.
She draws support for her argument from a line of cases starting
with Soulos and continuing with Gorecki v. Canada (Attorney
General),  O.J. No. 1130, 265 D.L.R. (4th) 206 (C.A.);
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada
(Attorney General),  3 S.C.R. 660,  S.C.J. No. 71,
2012 SCC 71 (“PIPSC”); and Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v.
United Steelworkers,  1 S.C.R. 271,  S.C.J. No. 6,
2013 SCC 6 (“Sun Indalex”). The appellant also relies on several
disappointed beneficiary cases I will consider later.
 I note by way of preface that all three cases involve a
party pursuing a remedial constructive trust, based on unjust
enrichment or wrongful acts. None of the cases raised squarely
or addressed the issue of whether remedial constructive trusts
are confined to these two bases. However, the appellant quotes
snippets of each in support of her argument to that effect.
 First, the appellant cites Gorecki. This was a proposed
class action in which the class members sought interest pay-
ments from the federal government on retroactive lump sum
disability pension payments under the Canada Pension Plan.
This court agreed with the motion judge’s conclusions (reported
at  O.J. No. 3465,  O. T.C. 712 (S.C.J.)) that the gov-
ernment did not owe the plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that there
was no basis for an unjust enrichment claim, leaving only the
claim for a constructive trust based on a wrongful act. However,
this court disagreed with the motion judge’s conclusion that,
since the constructive trust is an evolving remedy, it would be
wrong to dismiss the wrongful act claim on a pleading motion.
Sharpe J.A., writing for the court, dismissed the wrongful act
claim, explaining, at para. 11:
As I have already explained, the Crown is under no equitable obligation in
relation to CPP benefits. Nor, for reasons already explained, does the Crown
owe the appellant any equitable obligation or duty of loyalty. As the claim
for interest relates to a claim for a statutory benefit, it is difficult to see any