before the courts and its determination was not necessary to the
decisions. Further, such a reading would be inconsistent with
the words of McLachlin J. in Soulos.
(4) The reach of Soulos
 In Soulos, McLachlin J. worked through the history of
constructive trusts in order to discern whether and how to recognize a remedial constructive trust for wrongful acts, which
was the particular problem in the case before her. In my view,
she did not purport to restate and reframe the law of constructive trusts for all purposes, and she said nothing to close the
categories of constructive trusts. Had she intended to abolish
good conscience constructive trusts beyond the categories of
unjust enrichment and wrongful acts, then one would have
expected clear and definitive language to that effect, but there is
none. Instead, McLachlin J.’s choice of language justifies the
conclusion that the court expected constructive trust law to continue to develop beyond the categories of unjust enrichment and
 Justice McLachlin disagreed with the position that a
constructive trust cannot be imposed where there has been no
unjust enrichment, at para. 16, which was the real issue in the
case. She stated, at para. 17:
The history of the law of constructive trust does not support this view.
Rather, it suggests that the constructive trust is an ancient and eclectic
institution imposed by law not only to remedy unjust enrichment, but to
hold persons in different situations to high standards of trust and probity
and prevent them from retaining property which in “good conscience” they
should not be permitted to retain.
 Justice McLachlin made several other pertinent obser-
vations of more general application, at paras. 20-22:
Canadian courts have never abandoned the principles of constructive trust
developed in England. They have, however, modified them. . . .
This Court’s assertion that a remedial constructive trust lies to prevent
unjust enrichment in cases such as Pettkus v. Becker should not be taken as
expunging from Canadian law the constructive trust in other circumstances
where its availability has long been recognized. The language used makes
no such claim. A. J. McClean, . . . describes the ratio of Pettkus v Becker as
a “a modest enough proposition”. He goes on: “It would be wrong . . . to read
it as one would read the language of a statute and limit further development
of the law”.
Other scholars agree that the constructive trust as a remedy for unjust
enrichment does not negate a finding of a constructive trust in other