defendant’s enrichment. To succeed on the first element, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was enriched. For
the second element, the plaintiff must show that he or she sustained a corresponding deprivation. Finally, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant’s enrichment occurred without a juristic
reason. If there are no existing categories of juristic reason that
can justify the defendant’s enrichment, then the court “may take
into account the legitimate expectations of the parties . . . and
moral and policy-based arguments about whether particular
enrichments are unjust”: Kerr, at para. 44.
 The application judge had no difficulty in finding the
respondent met the first two elements of the test. He noted:
The Respondent is enriched to the extent of the proceeds of the Policy. . . .
The Applicant has suffered a corresponding deprivation not only to the
extent she paid the premiums but also, more fundamentally, to the extent
the proceeds of the Policy were paid to the Respondent notwithstanding the
prior equitable assignment of such proceeds to her.
 As for the third element, the absence of a juristic reason
for the enrichment, the application judge found:
[W]hile the designation of a beneficiary [under the Insurance Act] may be a
juristic reason in some cases, the issue for the Court is whether the designa-
tion of the Respondent is a juristic reason in the particular circumstances of
On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that a court is not precluded from
imposing a constructive trust on proceeds of an insurance policy paid to
a named beneficiary based on the principle of unjust enrichment merely
because the deceased policyholder executed a designation in favour of
the named beneficiary.
 In reaching this conclusion, the application judge distinguished this court’s decision in Richardson Estate. He found it
was not a “useful authority” and was not dispositive.
(2) The appellant’s arguments
 The appellant does not contest the first element of
unjust enrichment: her enrichment. She does contest the second
element, the respondent’s deprivation, and the third, the
absence of a juristic reason for her enrichment.
(a) The deprivation element
 The appellant disputes the deprivation finding on three
grounds, which I address in the sequence in which she makes
 First, the appellant submits the deprivation must be measured using a “straightforward economic approach”, drawing on
the Supreme Court’s language in Pacific National Investments,