at para. 20. The appellant submits that the respondent’s deprivation, in restitutionary terms, should be limited to the premiums she paid from 2000 until the deceased’s death, which is
about $7,000. She asserts this is too small an amount to justify
the remedy of a constructive trust, drawing on this court’s
observation in Richardson Estate, where the amount of premiums paid was $1,161.
 I would reject this submission. I observe that the respondent’s contribution to maintaining the policy since separation was
more than $7,000. From its inception in 1985, the respondent’s
contribution was considerably greater, about $30,000 according
to the evidence. It is not reasonable to discount her contribution
on the basis that she had the benefit of the policy during her
marriage. On either amount, this would not be a minimal deprivation unworthy of the court’s attention.
 Second, the appellant argues that the remedy for the
deprivation is not to give the insurance proceeds to the respondent, since that would wrongly reward her “expectation interest”,
not her “restitutionary interest”, which is to be measured by
the direct expenditures made. Third, the appellant makes the
related argument that the respondent is not entitled to a proprietary remedy for the deceased’s breach of the oral agreement.
 I would reject both arguments. This is not, contrary to
the appellant’s argument, a simple case of breach of contract.
 I pause here to address a lurking concern that is found
in some of the disappointed beneficiary cases, which I analyze
more intensely below, and in my colleague’s reasons. This is the
fear described by Professor McInnes of “judges roaming willy-nilly . . . with only their inner voices to guide them”, quoted
by McLachlin J. in Peel. It is also reflected in the statement,
with which I agree, that Soulos counselled courts to be “careful
to avoid inviting judges to impose such trusts whenever and
wherever they believe justice requires” in Love v. Love, 
S.J. No. 147, 2013 SKCA 31, 359 D.L.R. (4th) 504, para. 47.
There is a fear, which I do not share, that granting a constructive trust remedy to the former spouse whose claim was rooted
in breach of contract only would make it difficult to resist the
migration of the concept to the general law of contract:
see Ladner v. Wolfson,  B.C.J. No. 1692, 2011 BCCA 370,
341 D.L.R. (4th) 299, at para. 52, leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused  S.C.C.A. No. 475. These expressions simply
reflect the tension I referred to earlier between law and equity.
 To be clear, I do not take the position that any breach of
contract would or should lead to the imposition of a constructive
trust. In my view, the disappointed beneficiary cases must be