circumstances, giving the plaintiff a share of the property proportionate to her contribution could be appropriate.
 The general rule in the domestic cases is that a plaintiff must establish that “a monetary award would be insufficient in the circumstances”: Kerr, at para. 52; and Peter v.
Beblow,  1 S.C.R. 980,  S.C.J. No. 36, at para. 31
(p. 999 S.C.R.). In Peter, McLachlin J. noted, at para. 31, that,
“in looking at whether a monetary award is insufficient the
court may take into account the probability of the award’s
being paid as well as the special interest in the property
acquired by the contributions”. In deciding whether to grant
a proprietary remedy instead of a monetary award, “the court
may take into account the probability of recovery, as well as
whether there is a reason to grant the plaintiff the additional
rights that flow from recognition of property rights”: Kerr,
at para. 52. There is no doubt that, if the respondent is not
given the proceeds of the insurance policy in this case, she will
get nothing, since the estate has no assets to pay a damages
award for breach of contract.
 In my view, consideration of these factors supports the
imposition of a remedial constructive trust in this case. Contrary
to the appellant’s argument, the respondent’s financial contribution is not the correct measure of her deprivation. The appellant’s entitlement under the designation crystallized at the
moment of the deceased’s death under the beneficiary designation. At that moment, both had a claim to the same asset. In my
view, the deprivation the respondent would suffer if the appellant were successful is the full payout of the life insurance proceeds, not the amount of the premiums she paid. That is the
asset — the chose in action — for which she paid, of which she
stands deprived and which she seeks to have restored to her.
The appellant contributed nothing to the acquisition of the asset
 In my view, the deprivation element of the unjust
enrichment test has been met to the full extent of the insurance
payout in the respondent’s favour. In the context, the relevant
enrichment is to be measured by the possible benefit to the
appellant, and the deprivation to the respondent must correspondingly be measured in the same terms: Kerr, at para. 39.
That is the full value of the life insurance proceeds. To use that
measure would be to take the relevant “straightforward economic
approach” required by the Supreme Court in Pacific National
Investments, as adapted by the court in Kerr.