Justice Cromwell listed the categories of juristic reasons
in Kerr, at para. 41, as the existence of a contract or a donative
intent, and a disposition of law such as common law, equitable or
statutory obligations. The appellant invokes disposition of law
as the relevant juristic reason.
 Justice Cromwell elaborated on the second step of the
juristic reason analysis, at para. 44 of Kerr: “[I]f the case falls
outside the existing categories, the court may take into account
the legitimate expectations of the parties . . . and moral and
policy-based arguments about whether particular enrichments
are unjust”. He added that “the test for juristic reason is flexible,
and the relevant factors to consider will depend on the situation
before the court”. Finally, he noted, at para. 45: “questions
regarding how (and when) factors relating to the manner in
which the parties organized their relationship should be taken
( ii) The disposition of law category of juristic reason
does not apply to this case
 In Kerr, Cromwell J. included common law, equitable
and statutory obligations in the category of “disposition of law”.
This category operates, he noted, where “the enrichment of the
defendant at the plaintiff’s expense is required by law, such as
where a valid statute denies recovery” (para. 41). The appellant
argues this is precisely how s. 191 of the Insurance Act was
intended to operate in the circumstances presented by this case.
I do not agree.
The first step of the juristic reason analysis is
 It is necessary to carefully consider the relevant purpose
of the legislation that is asserted to constitute a juristic reason
for refusing equitable relief, in this case ss. 190 and 191 of the
Insurance Act, which I reproduce for convenience.
 Section 190 provides:
190(1) [A]n insured may in a contract or by a declaration designate . . .
a beneficiary as one to whom or for whose benefit insurance money is to be
(2) Subject to section 191, the insured may from time to time alter or
revoke the designation by a declaration.
Section 191 provides:
191(1) An insured may in a contract, or by a declaration . . . filed with the
insurer at its head or principal office in Canada during the lifetime of the
person whose life is insured, designate a beneficiary irrevocably, and in that