event the insured, while the beneficiary is living, may not alter or revoke
the designation without the consent of the beneficiary and the insurance
money is not subject to the control of the insured, is not subject to the claims
of the insured’s creditor and does not form part of the insured’s estate.
 The task at the first step of considering whether a juristic reason exists to deny the plaintiff’s recovery is not a mere
exercise in mechanical pigeonholing. For example, in Peter,
it was argued that the legislative decision to exclude unmarried
couples from property division legislation was the juristic reason
that prevented the court from using the equitable doctrine
of unjust enrichment to address their property dispute. The
Supreme Court rejected the argument in Peter, where McLachlin J., said, at p. 994 S.C.R.: “It is precisely where an injustice
arises without a legal remedy that equity finds a role.”
As Cromwell J. explained in Kerr, at para. 45, this argument
“misapprehended the role of equity”.
 The purpose of what are now ss. 190 and 191 of the
Insurance Act was discussed in Shannon v. Shannon (1985),
50 O.R. (2d) 456,  O.J. No. 2501 (H.C.J.), Shannon v.
Shannon Estate,  O.J. No. 1129 (H.C.J.). Justice McKinlay
(as she then was) imposed a trust in circumstances somewhat
similar to those in this case. The deceased was obliged under a
separation agreement [at p. 458 O.R.] “to continue to name his
wife a beneficiary” and “not to revoke such beneficiary designation at anytime in the future”. A year later, the deceased filed a
“new revocable beneficiary designation form” under the Insurance Act naming the defendants. He died shortly thereafter. The
assets in his estate would not have satisfied a judgment in
favour of his former spouse for breach of contract.
 The plaintiff took the position that by virtue of the pro-
vision in the separation agreement (para. 5):
[T]he insurance policy and the proceeds became impressed with a trust, and
that the designation by the insured of [the defendants] as beneficiaries con-
stituted a disposition of trust property to volunteers who could not take the
trust property in the face of a prior trust for value in favour of the wife of
 Justice McKinlay found, at para. 10, that language in
a separation agreement could function as a revocable designation under what is now s. 190 of the Insurance Act. She then
addressed the defendant’s argument, described at para. 13
(p. 461 O.R.), “that any finding of the court of a trust in favour of
the plaintiff would have the effect of the court’s attempting to
overrule a clear statutory provision”, being the insured’s right
to change the designation under the predecessor to s. 190 of
the Insurance Act.