benefited volunteer like the appellant over a party with a prior
right to an asset like the respondent. I would conclude that
these factors favour the respondent, not the appellant.
( iii) This court’s decision in Richardson Estate does
not determine the outcome of this appeal
 The appellant relies on this court’s decision in
Richardson Estate. There, the deceased had designated his former
spouse as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. Their separation agreement obliged the deceased to maintain her as the beneficiary under the policy until February 28, 1995. He told his
second spouse that he would re-designate her as the beneficiary
at a later date but he never did. The second spouse continued
to pay the insurance premiums from the joint bank account
she held with the deceased, wrongly believing she was the beneficiary.
 When the former spouse in Richardson Estate refused to
release her claim to the death benefit, the second spouse brought
a motion claiming a constructive trust over the death benefit.
The motion judge found there was no unjust enrichment because
the first spouse’s designation as a beneficiary under the policy
was a juristic reason for the second spouse’s enrichment: Richardson Estate v. Mew (2009), 93 O.R. (3d) 537,  O.J.
No. 4892 (S.C.J.). He recognized he had the power to rectify the
policy, but he was not satisfied the evidence established the
deceased’s failure to change the beneficiary designation was the
result of a mistake.
 This court [(2009), 96 O.R. (3d) 65,  O.J. No. 1947
(C.A.)] found the separation agreement was not dispositive,
since it only obliged the deceased to maintain the policy until the
end of February 1995. The agreement contemplated that the
amount of life insurance the deceased was to hold in favour of
his first spouse in the future was to be determined in a later var-
iation proceeding, but that never happened. Based on the case
law, Gillese J.A., writing for this court, found, at para. 55:
A former spouse is entitled to proceeds of a life insurance policy if his or her
designation as beneficiary has not changed. This result follows even where
there is a separation agreement in which the parties exchange mutual
releases and renounce all rights and claims in the other’s estate. General
expressions of the sort contained in releases do not deprive a beneficiary
of rights under an insurance policy because loss of status as a beneficiary is
accomplished only by compliance with the legislation. The general language
used in waivers and releases does not amount to a declaration within
the meaning of the Insurance Act.