This court agreed with the motion judge that it would
not be unjust for the first spouse to take the death benefit,
noting, at para. 61: “[T]here is a juristic reason for Ms. Mew’s
enrichment — she was the named beneficiary of the Policy.”
 I would distinguish this case from Richardson Estate
on several grounds, despite some factual similarities. First,
and most importantly, there was no contractual obligation in
Richardson Estate to his second spouse that he would change
the beneficiary designation on the life insurance policy. Indeed,
the motion judge in Richardson Estate stated specifically, at
. . . I am unable to say, with anything approaching the level of confidence
necessary to grant rectification, that the evidence establishes that the con-
tinuation of Stephenie as the beneficiary of the policy was a mistake and
that Michael’s true intent was to name Anne as the beneficiary.
The motion judge added, at para. 64, that “the evidence does not
satisfy me that the designation of Stephenie was a result of a
mistake or that Michael had a contrary intent”. This is a long
way from the application judge’s conclusion in this case that
there was an oral contract.
 Second, there was no impediment to a re-designation of
the beneficiary in Richardson Estate, such as the oral agreement
in this case.
 Third, the respondent made a much more robust contribution to the life insurance policy by way of premiums than her
counterpart in Richardson Estate.
 Accordingly, I would not consider the outcome of
Richardson Estate as dispositive of the matter in the appellant’s
 In my view, s. 191 of the Insurance Act does not provide
a juristic reason to oust the availability of a constructive trust
over the life insurance proceeds based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Soulos, despite the Richardson Estate decision.
( iv) The disappointed beneficiary cases
 In this section of the reasons, I consider the disappointed
beneficiary cases. They are not on all fours with this case, but
resemble it in material details. Many of them have taken the
unjust enrichment route to a constructive trust, so it is not surprising that this case proceeded as it did.
 I begin with two pertinent observations. First, I note
that the disappointed beneficiary cases fit rather awkwardly
into the structure of the unjust enrichment analysis. The typical pattern in familial unjust enrichment cases involves a dispute between spouses in which the plaintiff seeks to acquire