29 E.T.R. (3d) 181 (S.C.J.); and Holowa Estate v. Stell-Holowa,
 A.J. No. 51, 2011 ABQB 23, 506 A.R. 260. The list is not
 The second category are those dismissing the plaintiff’s
claim to a constructive trust, taking Soulos into account. This
category includes Ladner v. Wolfson and Milne Estate v. Milne,
 B.C.J. No. 2763, 2014 BCSC 2112, 54 R.F.L. (7th) 328,
which followed Ladner.
 The third category of disappointed beneficiary cases are
those in which the plaintiff was unsuccessful in securing a constructive trust, largely on the basis that the deceased’s intention
to benefit the plaintiff was not sufficiently clear. These include
Kang v. Kang,  B.C.J. No. 2918, 2002 BCCA 696; Richardson Estate; Chanowski v. Bauer,  M.J. No. 319, 2010
MBCA 96, 258 Man. R. (2d) 244; and Love. This category of cases
is not relevant.
 The appellant argues that the cases in the first category
have been overtaken by Soulos and are not good law. I will attend
to this argument after describing cases from each category.
Cases granting a remedial constructive trust
 Shannon is a pre-Soulos decision. The details were discussed above. Despite what she implicitly found was a revocable
insurance designation, McKinlay J. imposed a trust on the life
insurance proceeds, relying on a provision in the separation
agreement. I see no meaningful difference between the effects of
the words used in the separation agreement in Shannon and the
oral agreement found by the application judge in this case.
 In Steeves, the husband was ordered by the court to
maintain a life insurance policy in favour of his former wife.
Before his death, he designated his second wife as the beneficiary of the policy. Since the policy was provided as an employment benefit to the deceased, the plaintiff had not contributed to
it. Steeves is also pre-Soulos, but the trial judge invoked the
Supreme Court jurisprudence that led to Soulos including
Rathwell, Pettkus and Peter in reaching the conclusion that
a constructive trust was warranted.
 Creaghan J. noted, at para. 31, that the deceased’s failure
to comply with the court’s order was wrongful. The estate lacked
assets, pointing to “the absence of an adequate remedy to the
plaintiff at law”. He also noted that the defendant “is not a bona
fide purchaser for value, but rather, is in the nature of what has
been referred to at law as an innocent volunteer”. He concluded,
at para. 35, that the three-part test for unjust enrichment from