Pettkus was met. Finally, at para. 36, he described the construc-
tive trust impressed on the policy proceeds:
The constructive trust that arises in this instance is that Roger Steeves
held the inchoate proceeds of the insurance policy in the event of his death
in trust for the Plaintiff and that upon his death, where the proceeds could
be traced and had not come into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for
value, an equitable lien attached to them in the hands of the Defendant
Dorilla Harper Steeves.
 The facts giving rise to a constructive trust in Roberts
differ. The husband renounced his rights in his former wife’s
property. He remained the policy beneficiary when his former
wife died because she did not take steps to change the designa-
tion to her sister and caregiver, Ms. Roberts, whom she wished
to be the beneficiary. The British Court of Appeal did not permit
the insurance designation to stand in the way of imposing a
constructive trust. Speaking for the court, Southin J.A. stated,
at paras 24-27:
Constructive trusts have been imposed in many cases where the defendant
has done nothing which could properly be characterized as “fraudulent”.
There was no fraud, for instance, in Pettkus v. Becker,  2 S.C.R. 834, or
in Hussey v. Palmer,  3 All E.R. 744, in which Lord Denning spoke of
imposing a trust “whenever justice and good conscience require it”.
There is in this proposition the very great danger of judges invoking their
personal predilections. “Good conscience” is an infinitely variable concept
upon which reasonable men and women, and therefore reasonable judges,
may have widely divergent opinions.
But I am comfortable in this case in saying that it would be against good
conscience for the appellants to keep this money because Mr. Martindale
had, by the separation agreement, surrendered any right he might have had
to the property of the deceased. A policy of life insurance is a species of property of the insured, albeit the amount payable under the contract of insurance does not fall into possession until the insured’s death, and, by law,
cannot be taken by the insured’s creditors.
For the appellant, Mr. Martindale, to claim from the insurer the proceeds
was a breach of the separation agreement and such a breach is sufficient,
in my opinion, to call in aid the doctrine of the remedial constructive trust.
To put it another way, it is not the mistaken belief of Mrs. Martindale which
gives rise to a remedy; it is the bargain which Mr. Martindale made.
 The court did not refer to Soulos.
 The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench reached a similar
result in Holowa Estate. Ms. Hanrahan was the estranged spouse
of the deceased. She was defined legislatively as his “pension
partner” under the applicable pension plan and was entitled to
the proceeds on his death. The deceased had failed to get a matrimonial property order that would have changed Ms. Hanrahan’s
status. The application judge found, at para. 50, that