remedy of a constructive trust does not breach any law. Experience with constructive trusts in the disappointed beneficiary
context would undoubtedly add other refinements.
 The disappointed beneficiary cases represent a distinct
type of case in which the constructive trust remedy is disciplined
by the common structure and elements of the dispute, which
ought to serve to assuage the concern that equity is off on a frolic
of its own, paying no attention to the law. Equity follows the law;
the imposition of a constructive trust does not block the law’s
operation, which in this case is the operation of the Insurance
Act; it imposes an obligation in conscience on the appellant the
moment her entitlement to the proceeds attaches, one that
requires her to hold the proceeds in trust for the respondent.
 To my mind, the disappointed beneficiary cases constitute a genus in which a constructive trust can be imposed on
life insurance proceeds consistently with the reasoning of
McLachlin J. in Soulos. They are situations in which courts have
found a constructive trust.
 I do not agree with the appellant’s argument that those
disappointed beneficiary cases in which the court granted a
remedial constructive trust have been overtaken by Soulos and
are not good law, for several reasons.
 First, I am not persuaded by the obiter in Ladner and
Love that the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s reasoning
in Roberts is to be doubted in light of Soulos. Neither court
explained the basis for the doubt apart from the lack of a mention of Soulos in the decisions under review.
 Second, I would distinguish Ladner itself on two bases.
The case proceeded under the rubric of wrongful act, which has
a detailed set of elements according to Soulos that do not apply
to the unjust enrichment rubric. Further, the proprietary connection between the new and old insurance policies that was
missing in Ladner was very much present in this case between
the policy and the payment of the premiums by the respondent.
 Finally, in light of the limits I discussed earlier, I do not
share the Ladner court’s underlying concern that constructive
trusts would become unmanageable.
 Equity asks a pertinent question in the difficult dilemma
posed in the disappointed beneficiary cases: Which of the two
claimants has the superior claim to the life insurance proceeds?
Equity’s answer, all things being equal, is to assist the one
with the superior right in equity, as McKinlay J. pointed out in
Shannon. In this case, that is the respondent, as the application judge found.