circumstances of “abuse or some other flagrant impropriety on the part of
the Crown in withdrawing the charges”.
 There is no question that statutory courts have jurisdiction to hear applications for Charter relief and grant costs as
part of a remedy under s. 24(1): R. v. Tiffin (2008), 90 O.R. (3d)
575,  O.J. No. 1525, 2008 ONCA 306; Dunedin, at para.
97. But this implied power is not without parameters. Specifically, the implied power is linked to the court’s control of its trial
process: Dunedin, at para. 81.
 Applying Dunedin, I conclude that the summary conviction court judge has no jurisdiction to hear the costs application
in this case for several reasons. First, the court’s process is not
invoked when the Crown exercises its prerogative to enter a stay
pursuant to s. 579 of the Criminal Code. Second, neither the
Superior Court of Justice nor the summary conviction court
has jurisdiction to entertain an application for an alleged breach
of a Charter right once a stay is entered pursuant to s. 579.
Third, a principled approach to the question of jurisdiction of
statutory courts to award costs, as set out in Dunedin, does not
support a conclusion that the summary conviction court judge in
this matter retained jurisdiction to hear the costs application
after the Crown-directed stay.
 To the first point, an important distinction between
Fercan and this case arises from the power invoked by the Crown
under s. 579 of the Criminal Code. Section 579(1) states that:
579(1) The Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for that purpose
may, at any time after any proceedings . . . are commenced and before judg-
ment, direct the clerk or other proper officer of the court to make an entry on
the record that the proceedings are stayed by his direction[.]
 It is the Attorney General or his agent who is in control.
The entry of a stay is an administrative act beyond the direction
or control of the trial judge: R. v. Jones (1996), 5 C.R. (5th) 364
(C.A.); R. v. Balderstone,  M.J. No. 207, 23 Man. R. (2d)
125 (C.A.). Once the Crown has exercised its right under s. 579
to direct a stay of proceedings, the judge, whether a summary
conviction court judge or a Superior Court judge, is functus:
R. v. Smith,  B.C.J. No. 2730, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 70 (C.A.),
leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed for delay  S.C.C.A.
 Clearly, in a situation where a trial judge comes to a final
disposition in a matter, including entering a judicial stay of
proceedings, he or she retains jurisdiction to craft an appropriate
remedy for a Charter violation, including awarding costs,
where appropriate. That is because a remedy under s. 24(1) of the