Charter, in those circumstances, is part of the trial judge’s discretionary adjudicative process. In Fercan, for example, the application judge concluded that the Crown’s forfeiture application was
meritless and that the Crown’s overall conduct rose to the level of
a marked and unacceptable departure from the standard expected
of the Crown. Costs were awarded on the basis of the application
judge’s findings, and an interpretation of the function and purpose
of the forfeiture provisions in the CDSA.
 The same cannot be said in circumstances where the
Crown exercises its discretion to direct a stay of proceedings,
a decision which, in no way, requires any findings of fact or
adjudication of issues, and over which the trial judge has no
power to interfere.
 Thus, an important part of the foundation for the court’s
conclusion in Fercan, the implied power of the court to control
its own process, is lacking in this case, given the nature of the
power granted to the Crown under s. 579 of the Criminal Code.
 Second, neither the Superior Court nor the summary
conviction court has jurisdiction to entertain an application
alleging a violation of the respondents’ Charter rights once
a stay has been entered under s. 579 of the Criminal Code. See
Smith, at p. 80 C.C.C.:
Without a Charter consideration, it is clear that once the Crown exercises
its s. 579 right to direct a stay be entered, the judge hearing the prosecution
is functus and without jurisdiction to proceed further. Does the Charter
change that? With respect, I think not.
 The following passage from Smith, also at p. 80 C.C.C.,
was quoted with approval by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Larosa, 
O.J. No. 3219, 166 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (C.A.), at para. 41 of his
When the stay has been entered there is no contest between the individual
and the state. The prosecution has come to an end. The position of the
accused as against the state is the same as if he had never been charged.
The individual is not put at jeopardy by the stay. On the contrary, the jeop-
ardy he faced as an accused in an ongoing prosecution has come to an end.
It may be that if in this case a new indictment is preferred, an argument
could be made that the action of the Crown in staying and preferring a new
indictment, gives rise to Charter violations. However, at the moment a stay
is entered, and assuming the matter stops there, I can see no possible viola-
tion of the accused’s Charter rights.
 In Larosa, the appellants alleged the conduct of the
Crown during the criminal proceedings, and then in staying the
criminal proceedings, amounted to an abuse of process, particularly as it related to Pagano, an accused for whom extradition to
the United States was made possible by the Crown’s stay of