criminal proceedings in Canada. The appellants sought to have
the stay reviewed and set aside. Doherty J.A. rejected their
submissions, at paras. 42-43 of his reasons, and held that even if
these claims had merit, they would provide no basis for interfering with the Crown’s decision to enter a stay and would only be
germane if criminal proceedings were reinstituted.
 In this case, the respondents do not complain that the
Crown’s entry of a stay was improper. At most, the respondents
allege negligence on the part of the Crown.2 As this court noted
in R. v. Singh (2016), 129 O.R. (3d) 241,  O.J. No. 665,
2016 ONCA 108, 28 C.R. (7th) 124 (“Singh, 2016”), at paras.
33-34, the concept of “marked and substantial departure” indicates a deviation from a norm that goes beyond negligence.
I agree with the Superior Court’s comments on the certiorari
application that it is “highly debatable” whether a costs remedy
would be appropriate in this case, and more importantly, that
the application should only be entertained in circumstances of
“abuse or some other flagrant impropriety on the part of the
Crown in withdrawing charges”. It was the respondents’ prerogative to not challenge the Crown’s decision to stay the proceedings. Indeed, the decision meant that the respondents no
longer faced the jeopardy of being convicted, nor would they
need to expend any further resources in defending themselves.
In the absence of an argument that the Crown acted improperly
by directing a stay, there was no basis for the summary conviction court judge in this case to conclude that he had jurisdiction to hear a costs application. Nothing in the jurisprudence
suggests that, in circumstances such as the present, the power of
the Attorney General to stay proceedings is circumscribed by the
courts’ implied power to control its own process. The stay pursuant to s. 579 brought proceedings to an end.
 Neither the Superior Court nor the summary conviction
court would have had jurisdiction to entertain an application for
costs once the stay was entered. Thus, the argument that the
2 The respondents’ costs application alleged (1) the CRA was negligent in
advancing an information to obtain search warrants that did not disclose
reasonable grounds for the issuance of the search warrants; (2) the Crown
did not bring a timely application to have their prior counsel removed due
to a conflict of interest; (3) the Crown prevented the respondents from
bringing an application to have the evidence obtained from the search
warrants excluded; (4) the Crown failed to exercise reasonable care in
assessing the reasonableness of the grounds contained in the information
to obtain the search warrants; and (5) the Crown failed to consider the
reasonableness of any of the areas the respondents proposed to cross-examine the affiant of the information to obtain.