summary conviction court should have jurisdiction to award
costs because the Superior Court has jurisdiction to do so,
another key element of LaForme J.A.’s reasoning in Fercan, does
not assist the respondents.
 Finally, while Dunedin supports a flexible and functional
approach to determining the power of statutory courts to award
Charter remedies, nothing in the jurisprudence suggests that
the test for determining jurisdiction set out in Dunedin has
been abandoned in favour of an ad hoc approach to determining
jurisdiction based on a party’s request to litigate costs or obtain
particular relief. The notice the respondents provided in this
case, whether proper notice or not, does not determine the
court’s jurisdiction to hear the application after the stay was
entered. Nor is the question of jurisdiction discretionary based
on the applicant’s financial position, or a judge’s personal view of
what is fair.
 Rather, Dunedin recognized that there will be circumstances where costs awards are “integrally connected” to the
function of the statutory court and the court’s ability to control
its trial process by disciplining conduct on the part of the prosecution which is not simple negligence but which falls far below
the standard expected of those representing the public’s interest
and results in the court’s process being usurped.
 I would reiterate this court’s comments in Singh, 2016
and R. v. Ciarniello (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 561,  O.J.
No. 3444, 41 C.R. (6th) 310 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C.
refused  S.C.C.A. No. 424, that there continues to be a
fundamental difference in the purpose for awarding costs in
the civil context versus the criminal one. Unlike with civil pro-
ceedings, indemnity and compensation are not the focus of
costs awards in the criminal context. As noted in Singh, 2016,
at para. 52, quoting Ciarniello, at para. 33, the Crown is not
an ordinary litigant, in that the Crown prosecutes and makes
decisions respecting prosecutions based on the public interest.
For that reason,
Costs are not usually deployed in criminal law to influence the conduct of
litigation. . . . As the Crown acts in the public interest when conducting
criminal prosecutions, it is said that its discretion should not be influenced
or fettered by the threat of a costs award.
 The respondents’ position all but disregards the fundamentally different purpose of costs awards in criminal proceedings.
 Finally, I would simply note that the fact that Fercan
involved an innocent third party bystander, as opposed to an
accused person, is important. First, there is a significant access