the Insurance Act does not say this is the case, and there was no
argument on this point either, since equitable assignment was
not made an issue on the application.
 For all the foregoing reasons, the application judge’s finding that the oral agreement constituted an equitable assignment
cannot stand, in my opinion. Absent equitable assignment or
some other basis upon which it could be said that Mr. Moore had
placed the policy or its proceeds out of his control and into
the hands of Ms. Moore, Ms. Moore must look to a remedial
constructive trust for relief. On the application, she focused on
unjust enrichment in this regard.
 I turn to the trust issues raised on the appeal now.
 I begin this portion of the analysis with the observation
that this is not one of those cases — in spite of what it may seem
at first impression — where the “equities” are heavily weighted
in favour of one party or the other.
 It is the case that Ms. Moore had an oral agreement with
Mr. Moore that if she paid the premiums she would receive the
proceeds of the policy. It is the case that she paid the premiums.
And it is the case that Mr. Moore breached the agreement by
designating Ms. Sweet as the irrevocable beneficiary under
 On the other hand, Mr. Moore was a man of limited
means, living in the post-separation period on a disability pension, and suffering from the disabilities associated with his
physical, mental and substance abuse issues. Ms. Sweet — who
is herself disabled — took care of Mr. Moore and, for practical
purposes, provided him with a home, a place to live and a supportive family during the 13 years of their relationship.
 There is little, if any, evidence on the record as to Ms.
Moore’s present financial needs. She continues to live in the
former matrimonial home after Mr. Moore’s transfer of his one-half interest at the time of separation. Ms. Sweet would appear
from the record to be in financial need. Indeed, her evidence is
that she was made a beneficiary of the policy because Mr. Moore
wanted to ensure that she would be able to remain in the
apartment home that she had occupied for 40 years by the time
of his death.
 On these facts, it cannot be said that Ms. Sweet is no
more than a volunteer who gave nothing in exchange for being
named irrevocable beneficiary, or that she is simply the recipient
of a windfall. She was a 13-year spouse with heavier than
normal caregiving duties (both she and Mr. Moore were disabled