in varying degrees) and was the person primarily responsible for
the home that they lived in.
 On the application, Ms. Moore’s position was that she was
entitled to the policy proceeds on the basis of unjust enrichment.
On appeal, her approach was more nuanced. She continued to
rely on unjust enrichment but embraced the application judge’s
finding of equitable assignment in support of the claim, as well.
She submitted that the application judge was correct in holding
that the irrevocable designation of beneficiary provisions in the
Insurance Act did not provide a juristic reason for Ms. Sweet’s
receipt of the proceeds. In the end, she fell back upon the more
expansive view that a constructive trust may be imposed “where
good conscience requires it”.
 I have already concluded that, on the way the case was
framed and argued before the application judge and on the record as it currently exists, it is not open for the court to determine
whether the oral agreement constituted an equitable assignment. I turn, then, to a consideration of whether the claim
for unjust enrichment can otherwise stand or, if not, whether
a remedial constructive trust should be found on some other
“good conscience” basis in these circumstances.
 In my view, Ms. Moore’s claim cannot succeed on either
 The elements of a claim for unjust enrichment are well
known and were addressed by the application judge. The claim
requires that there be (a) an enrichment; (b) a corresponding
deprivation; and (c) the absence of any juristic reason for the
enrichment: Pettkus v. Becker,  2 S.C.R. 834,  S.C.J.
No. 103, at p. 848 S.C.R.; Kerr v. Baranow,  1 S.C.R. 269,
 S.C.J. No. 10, 2011 SCC 10, at para. 32.
 Here, the application judge found that there was an
enrichment (Ms. Sweet’s receipt of the policy proceeds), a corresponding deprivation (Ms. Moore would not receive them and,
yet, there was a causal link between her payment of the premiums and the availability of the proceeds), and that the provisions of the Insurance Act did not provide a juristic reason for
Ms. Sweet’s retention of the policy proceeds. Ms. Sweet argues
that he applied both the corresponding deprivation and the
juristic reason parts of the test incorrectly.
 Ms. Sweet is right when she says that the application
judge’s finding of a corresponding deprivation to the extent of