the full value of the policy proceeds — as opposed to simply the
extent of the premiums she paid — is rooted in his finding that
the oral agreement constituted an equitable assignment. Since
I have concluded that the equitable assignment finding must be
set aside, the finding of a corresponding deprivation based on it
must fail as well.
 However, there may be other grounds on which it could
be said that Ms. Moore suffered a corresponding deprivation to
Ms. Sweet’s enrichment. Ms. Moore did continue to pay the premiums following the separation, unaware that she had been
replaced as beneficiary by Ms. Sweet, to a total amount of
approximately $7,000. Each payment kept the policy alive. It
might be said that since she paid the final premium before
death, Ms. Moore’s deprivation corresponded to Ms. Sweet’s
enrichment to the extent of the full policy proceeds.
 Ms. Sweet argues, on the other hand, that the “
deprivation” elements of an unjust enrichment claim are measured on
the basis of a “straightforward economic approach”, and that
“other considerations, such as moral and policy questions, are
appropriately dealt with at the juristic reason stage of the
analysis”: Kerr, at para. 37; Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co.,
 1 S.C.R. 629,  S.C.J. No. 21, 2004 SCC 25, at para.
31; Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada,  3 S.C.R. 762,
 S.C.J. No. 101, at p. 803 S.C.R. She contends that any
corresponding deprivation suffered by Ms. Moore is limited to
the loss of the moneys she paid ($7,000); that Ms. Moore is not
entitled to count her “expectation losses” (a breach of contract
concept) as deprivation, for purposes of unjust enrichment (see
Pacific National Investments Ltd. v. Victoria (City), 
3 S.C.R. 575,  S.C.J. No. 72, 2004 SCC 75); and that
the amount of the premiums paid ($7,000) is sufficiently insignificant, compared to the amount of the insurance proceeds
($250,000) to warrant the imposition of a constructive trust:
Richardson Estate v. Mew (2009), 96 O.R. (3d) 65,  O.J.
No. 1947, 2009 ONCA 403, at para. 40.
 In the end, I do not find it necessary to resolve this issue.
In my view, on the record here, Ms. Moore’s unjust enrichment
claim must fail because the irrevocable beneficiary designation
provisions of the Insurance Act provide a juristic reason justifying the receipt by Ms. Sweet of the insurance proceeds.
A valid juristic reason
 Respectfully, the application judge made two errors in his
assessment of the juristic reason element of unjust enrichment.
First, he failed to recognize the significance of Ms. Sweet’s