a seminal case dealing with remedial constructive trusts that
will be discussed below — and Bielny did not refer to Soulos.
 Moreover, in none of the authorities to which we have
been referred, or which my research has unearthed, has the
unsuccessful competing beneficiary been designated as the
irrevocable beneficiary of the policy proceeds. To the extent that
Shannon and other similar authorities may be read as suggesting that a simple contractual promise to make someone a beneficiary under a life insurance policy, albeit a promise for valuable
consideration, is sufficient to circumvent the clear statutory
requisites for an irrevocable beneficiary designation, I respectfully disagree.
 I need not go so far as to say that the designation of a
beneficiary as an irrevocable beneficiary under the Insurance
Act invariably trumps a prior claimant. There may be cases
where the insured, by agreement, has placed the policy or its
proceeds beyond his or her ability to deal with them, and, therefore, beyond his or her ability to make the purported irrevocable
designation. This, however, is not one of those cases.
The two-step analysis
 Further, the application judge failed to apply the required
two-step analysis to the juristic reason assessment. There is no
dispute that “[a]t the heart of the doctrine of unjust enrichment
lies the notion of restoring a benefit which justice does not permit one to retain”: Kerr, at para. 31, citing Peel, at p. 788 S.C.R.
Courts, however, have been careful to guard against the remedial
constructive trust turning into a completely unprincipled, open-ended remedy, the application of which depends on a particular
judge’s subjective view of what is unjust or goes against good
conscience — or, to put it in its classic formulation, that is
dependent “upon the length of the Chancellor’s foot”. In Canada,
the Supreme Court has developed the “absence of juristic
reason” as a mechanism for instilling a principled approach to
 Iacobucci J. addressed this point in Garland, at para. 40:
It is not of great use to speculate on why Dickson J. in Rathwell, supra,4
expressed the third condition as absence of juristic reason but I believe that
he may have wanted to ensure that the test for unjust enrichment was not
purely subjective in order to be responsive to Martland J.’s criticism in his
reasons that application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment contemplated
by Dickson J. would require “immeasurable judicial discretion” (p. 473). The
4 Rathwell v. Rathwell,  2 S.C.R. 436,  S.C.J. No. 14.