constructive trust in Canada is now limited to two categories
since the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Soulos —
unjust enrichment and wrongful acts — thereby eliminating
resort to a more elastic “good conscience” trust, i.e., one based
on no more than a sense of fairness to the effect that it would
be “against all good conscience” to deny a plaintiff recovery in
the circumstances of a particular case. At the end of the day,
Ms. Moore submits that good conscience is satisfied by giving
effect to the oral agreement without which the policy would not
have continued to exist.5
 It has long been accepted that equity is quintessential
never-say-never terrain, and that concepts respecting its application develop with the times and to meet the needs of particular circumstances. This long-standing principle may work
against establishing a completely closed set of categories as the
foundation for imposing a remedial constructive trust.
 At the same time, McLachlin J. was pretty clear in
Soulos that, while a constructive trust “may be imposed where
good conscience so requires” (para. 34), “[t]he situations which
the judge may consider in deciding whether good conscience
requires imposition of a constructive trust may be seen as falling
into two general categories” (unjust enrichment and situations
where property had been obtained by a wrongful act) (para. 36).
It was her view that “[w]ithin these two broad categories, there
is room for the law of constructive trust to develop and for
greater precision to be attained, as time and experience may dictate” (para. 43) [emphasis added]. Rothstein J. reaffirmed this
view in Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v.
Canada (Attorney General),  3 S.C.R. 660,  S.C.J.
No. 71, 2012 SCC 71, at paras. 144-45.
 I do not think it is necessary to resolve this debate for
purposes of this appeal.
 Most of the authorities in which courts have been willing
to override a beneficiary designation can be explained on the
basis of an agreement between one of the claimants and the
insured that removed the insured’s ability to designate a later
beneficiary.6 As noted earlier, Shannon involved a separation
5 It is not clear that this position is accurate. There is nothing in the record
to establish that, if she had ceased paying the premiums, Mr. Moore would
not have found a way to keep the policy alive. Although he was of limited
means, and on a disability pension, the premiums of $507.50 per year
were not unduly significant.
6 There is a second line of authorities arising in situations where claims
are made under the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 or