The appellant argued that, at most, Ms. Moore was entitled to the return of the $7,000 in premiums that she paid following the separation. I agree that she should receive that
amount, with interest, out of the proceeds held in court. I would
not extend this to include the premiums paid prior to separation.
Those premiums were paid from the joint account she held
with Mr. Moore prior to their separation. She and the children
received the protection that the payment of those premiums
afforded them during that period — she was the designated beneficiary in the event of his death — and he was as entitled to the
money in the account as she was.
 In my view, this is an appropriate case for the parties to
bear their own costs. Accordingly, I would make no order as to
costs, here or below.
 LAUWERS J.A. (dissenting): — I take a different view of
the law regarding unjust enrichment and constructive trusts
than my colleague, and therefore dissent.
 As my colleague notes, this case is about who should
receive the $250,000 proceeds of a life insurance policy on the
life of Lawrence Anthony Moore who died in 2013. Should the
proceeds be paid to the appellant, Risa Lorraine Sweet, with
whom the deceased lived from the summer of 2000 until his
death? Or should they be paid to his former spouse, the respondent Michelle Constance Moore?
 The application judge decided that the respondent
should receive the life insurance proceeds and ordered that the
life insurance proceeds be impressed with a trust in favour
of the respondent. I would dismiss the appeal for the following
A. The Factual and Legal Context
 The life insurance policy was issued in 1985 by a predecessor of RBC Life Insurance Company. From its inception until
the breakup of their marriage in 2000, the deceased and the
respondent paid the insurance premiums on the policy from
their joint account. Thereafter, the respondent paid the premiums under what the application judge found, at para. 47, to be
“an oral agreement with the [respondent] in 2000 to ensure that
the premiums payable in respect of the policy would be paid and
the proceeds would be available to support his former spouse
and children on his death”.
 On September 21, 2000, despite his oral agreement with
the respondent, the deceased signed an irrevocable change of
beneficiary form in favour of the appellant and then sent it to