According to the respondent, the financial irresponsibility of the deceased, including borrowing against the respondent’s
credit, related to his “history of medical issues including substance abuse”, which led to the respondent’s bankruptcy in
March 2000. She was not cross-examined on this evidence.
 The issue before the application judge expressed in the
notice of application was whether “[t]he Deceased and the Applicant entered into an express, valid and binding contract where
for consideration of the Applicant paying all Premiums for the
Policy, the Applicant would receive the Benefits”. However, nothing in the notice of application addressed the remedial route to
recovery, via constructive trust, express trust, equitable assignment, perfectionary trust or some other equitable mechanism.
 In the court below, the respondent simply asserted
the appellant “would be unjustly enriched if she receives the
deceased’s life insurance policy”. The respondent asked the court
to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of the insurance
policy in her favour, and invoked the doctrine of unjust enrichment developed in a line of cases including Soulos v. Korkontzilas
(1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 716,  2 S.C.R. 217,  S.C.J. No. 52.
(2) The application judge’s findings
 As requested by the respondent, the application judge
imposed a constructive trust on the proceeds of the insurance
policy in her favour.
 He found there was a valid and binding oral agreement
between the deceased and the respondent under which the
respondent would pay the premiums and would be entitled to
the proceeds of the insurance policy on the deceased’s death. The
application judge gave four reasons for this finding. First, he
found there was “a significant continuing purpose for the
agreement”, which was “to provide for the children of the Applicant and the Deceased as well as the Applicant”, since the
deceased continued to have obligations to his children at the
time of the agreement.
 Second, the application judge noted the respondent
started paying the premiums herself and continued to do so
until the date of the deceased’s death. He found she “would not
have paid the premiums out of her own account if she had not
obtained an equitable assignment of the proceeds of the policy in
her favour from the deceased”.
 Third, the evidence was that the deceased had no assets in
2000 and was dependent upon disability payments for his own
living expenses. He was not paying the insurance premiums and
he knew full well the respondent was. The application judge found: