The appellant argues Soulos limits the remedy of constructive trusts to unjust enrichment and wrongful acts. Therefore, the case abolished the doctrine of good conscience as a
general source of equitable jurisdiction. In her view, since the
facts do not substantiate either unjust enrichment, or wrongful
acts as the basis for a constructive trust, one should not have
been imposed in this case.
 Further, the appellant takes the position that, as a matter
of law, the respondent is not entitled to a proprietary interest in
the insurance proceeds, but has only an action in damages against
the estate based on the deceased’s breach of his oral agreement
with the respondent. (This would be an empty remedy since the
estate has no assets.)
 Accordingly, the appellant asserts the application judge
erred in finding that the doctrine of unjust enrichment permitted him to craft an equitable remedy to defeat the appellant’s
entitlement to the life insurance proceeds as the named irrevocable beneficiary under s. 191(1) of the Insurance Act. She
argues doing so was not consistent with this court’s decision in
Richardson Estate, which was binding on the application judge.
 The respondent argues, to the contrary, that in view of
the plainly duplicitous and inequitable conduct of the deceased
on the facts as found, the court has equitable jurisdiction, recognized in Soulos, to impose a constructive trust over the insurance proceeds in the respondent’s favour, despite s. 191 of the
Insurance Act. The respondent also submits Richardson Estate
is distinguishable. Further, the respondent relies on a group of
similar cases in which the court imposed a remedial constructive
trust that I will describe as the “disappointed beneficiary cases”.
These cases were wrongly decided, the appellant argues, since
Soulos “abolished the doctrine of good conscience constructive
 As framed by the parties, this appeal raises squarely, for
the first time in this court, whether the Supreme Court intended
in Soulos to confine the availability of remedial constructive
trusts to instances of unjust enrichment and wrongful gains
only.7 Although the facts are simple, the law is not.
7 There is academic support for both views. The view that Soulos is restrictive is implicitly supported by Donovan W.M. Waters, Q.C., et al., Waters’
Law of Trusts in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2012), at pp. 494-
500. For the view that Soulos was not restrictive, see Robert Chambers,
“Constructive trusts in Canada” (1999), 37:1 Alta. L. Rev. 173; A.H.
Oosterhoff et al., Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials,
8th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2014), pp. 735-36; Eileen E. Gillese, Law of
Trusts, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2014), at pp. 123-44.