Cheng was an investment advisor with approximately ten
years’ experience in the securities industry. He was registered as a
salesperson with the OSC in the period between 1998 and 2008.
Cheng worked for TD Securities in the same office as Miller.
II: PRELIMINARY ISSUE
 Before argument began on the appeal, the court was asked
to determine a motion, brought by Azeff and Bobrow, to admit
fresh evidence. The fresh evidence in question was an affidavit
from Azeff outlining issues that arose from problems associated
with an expert that he and Bobrow had retained for the hearing.
At the conclusion of submissions, the court dismissed the motion
and stated that our reasons for doing so would be provided as
part of our reasons on the appeal.
 The background facts to the motion can be stated briefly.
Azeff and Bobrow had retained an expert to assist counsel in
challenging the evidence to be led by the respondent. In February 2014, some months prior to the commencement of the hearing, the expert lost all of her work product through a computer
error. While efforts had been made to reproduce the lost material, the evidence of the expert was that it would take her six to
nine months to reproduce all of the lost work product.
 In July 2014, Azeff and Bobrow brought an application to
adjourn the hearing. That application was refused by the Panel.
In September 2014, Azeff and Bobrow sought judicial review of
the Panel’s decision on an urgent basis. The application for judicial review was dismissed. The hearing proceeded as scheduled
on September 29, 2014.
 Azeff and Bobrow complain that they were not able to
properly respond to the allegations against them because of the
problems arising from their expert’s lost work product. As I shall
mention later, Azeff and Bobrow renew this complaint as a
stand-alone ground of appeal. The stated purpose of, and need
for, the fresh evidence was to establish that the ability of Azeff
and Bobrow to respond to the allegations was seriously impaired
by the expert’s lost work product.
 The test for fresh evidence was established in R. v. Palmer,
 1 S.C.R. 759,  S.C.J. No. 126. Four factors are to be
( i) the evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due dil-
igence, it could have been adduced at trial provided that
this general principle will not be applied as strictly in a
criminal case as in civil cases;