( ii) the evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears
upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the trial;
( iii) the evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reason-
ably capable of belief; and
( iv) it must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when
taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected
to have affected the result.
 We concluded that the contents of the affidavit did not
satisfy the Palmer test for two principal reasons. First, the affidavit does not contain any facts or evidence. It essentially consists of submissions as to how Azeff and Bobrow were impaired
in their ability to respond to the allegations arising from the
expert’s lost work product. There is nothing in the affidavit that
adds to the ability of Azeff and Bobrow to argue this issue from
the transcript of the hearing before the Panel.
 Second, as we understood it, the expert was retained for
essentially two purposes. One was to assist counsel in his cross-examination of the respondent’s witnesses. The other was to
explore the possibility that there was an alternative source for
the disclosure of the material non-public information, unconnected to Azeff and Bobrow.
 With respect to the first purpose, I have already dealt
with the fact that the proposed fresh evidence does not reveal
anything that would not be apparent from the transcript. In
terms of the second purpose, there is no evidence from the
expert, or any other source, of any substantive results from the
expert’s efforts to find an alternative source for the material
non-public information. More than 18 months have passed since
the completion of the hearing, and the release of the merits decision, and yet nothing is offered by Azeff and Bobrow to substantiate their assertion that, if they had been given the time that
they say that their expert needed to recreate her work product,
some significant and relevant evidence would have been found.
On this point, we did not accept the position advanced by Azeff
and Bobrow that they were entitled to “stand pat”, since the conclusion of the hearing, in terms of any pursuit of the end goal
that the expert was retained to achieve. Consequently, the fresh
evidence fails to show that, if the expert had been given the time
that she claimed to need, any material evidence would have
been obtained that could have affected the result.
 For these reasons, we dismissed the motion to admit fresh