errors in lengthy reasons arising out of a complex proceeding.
Reasons are seldom perfect. The real question is whether any
such errors are fundamental to the reasonableness of the conclusion reached.
A. Finkelstein — Masonite
 The tipping chain is alleged to begin with Finkelstein.
The Panel concluded that Finkelstein had provided material
non-public information to Azeff regarding three corporate transactions: Masonite, Dynatec and Legacy. I begin with Masonite.
 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (“KKR”) is an American
private equity firm. In 2004, it was interested in buying all of
the outstanding shares of Masonite. Masonite was a reporting
issuer in Ontario. It was also a client of Davies. Finkelstein was
the lead lawyer on the proposed takeover.
 The potential deal for Masonite had been ongoing since at
least July 2004. On November 16, 2004, an urgent meeting was
called by Masonite with the Davies lawyers. While Finkelstein,
in his evidence, attempted to downplay the importance of this
meeting, a senior partner at Davies, Connelly, who was also
involved in the transaction, gave contrary evidence. The Panel
accepted Connelly’s evidence as to the urgency of the meeting. It
was entirely open to the Panel to prefer the evidence of Connelly
over that of Finkelstein. The Panel gave cogent reasons for that
conclusion and there is no basis for this court to interfere with it.
 The Panel concluded that Finkelstein not only knew on
November 16 that KKR and Masonite had agreed to a transaction, but also that it was priced at approximately $40 per
Masonite share, that it was to be paid for in cash, and that it
was to be completed quickly, likely by Christmas. Finkelstein
challenges each of those findings. In my view, none of those challenges can succeed.
 On the first point, the conclusion, that there was an
agreed deal, comes directly from the evidence of Connelly, who
said that it was the November 16 meeting where it became clear
that the transaction “was for real”. The nature of, and reason for,
the November 16 meeting, and the spike in the activity of the
Davies lawyers involved in the transaction directly after that
meeting, all serve to confirm that conclusion.
 The source for the conclusion that Finkelstein knew of
the price is less clear. To be fair, the respondent had contended
that Finkelstein knew that the price “was around” $40, not
that it was precisely $40. Finkelstein contended that he did not
know the price until November 24. Connelly did not recollect
price being discussed at the November 16 meeting. There were,