however, other pieces of evidence from which a conclusion could
be drawn that Finkelstein knew that the price would be around
$40. KKR had said, as early as July, that it valued Masonite at
$40–$42 per share. In October 2004, the president of Masonite
had told its board that that price range was still the range for
 In addition, Finkelstein himself, in his compelled interview
with the respondent, had said that Masonite had a threshold, or
minimum, price of $40 for the transaction.1 In that same inter-
view, Finkelstein was asked whether the $40 price was communi-
cated to him at the November 16 meeting. His response was:
I can’t say specifically whether it was or it wasn’t. I would imagine that it
 Finkelstein resiled from that statement in his evidence
before the Panel. However, it was open to the Panel to rely on
his earlier sworn statement, rather than his later recollection at
the hearing, in reaching their factual findings.
 Given all of those facts, given the urgency of the meeting
of November 16 and given that the result of that meeting was
that the transaction was now “real”, it was a reasonable inference for the Panel to draw that Finkelstein knew that the transaction was priced “at approximately $40” per Masonite share.
 The timing for the transaction flows more easily from the
established facts. First, the November 16 meeting, where the
transaction was confirmed, was called on an urgent basis. Second, there is the spike in activity of the Davies lawyers assigned
to the transaction directly after that meeting. Third, there is the
draft timetable that Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, the law firm
for KKR, sent to Davies for the transaction, that showed an
anticipated date for board approval, and the public announcement, of the deal prior to Christmas. Fourth is the evidence that
Finkelstein gave before the Panel that everyone was working
under the assumption that the transaction “was to be done as
quickly as possible”.
 It is clear from the above that Finkelstein possessed
material non-public information about the Masonite transaction
as of November 16. The fact of the transaction alone would constitute such information. What then happened?
 The answer to that question raises the issue of telephone
records and the first challenge to the inference, that the Panel
1 Pursuant to s. 13 of the Act, an OSC investigator may compel a person to
give evidence under oath.