establishes that Finkelstein ever identified any witness, or other
evidence, that he did not call, but would have called, but for
some uncertainty, or confusion, or lack of awareness, arising
from the content of the statement of allegations or of the proceeding generally.
 I cannot find any basis that would sustain a conclusion
that Finkelstein was not provided with procedural fairness, or
was not fully apprised of the case that he had to meet, or was
subject to any denial of natural justice.
(b) Denial of Adjournment
 Azeff and Bobrow say that they were unfairly hampered
in their ability to respond to the allegations because the Panel
refused to give them an adjournment of the hearing when their
expert’s work product was lost. This is, in effect, a renewal of the
argument that underlay the fresh evidence application.
 I earlier set out the background facts to this issue. I will
not repeat them here. The central contention of Azeff and
Bobrow is that their expert lacked sufficient time to recreate her
lost work product and, as a consequence, they were not properly
prepared as the hearing continued along. Azeff and Bobrow say
that they continually complained to the Panel about the negative ramifications to their positions because of this issue.
 The decision to permit or deny an adjournment is a
quintessential example of the exercise of a discretion.6 It will not
be interfered with unless the decision is clearly unreasonable or
based on a faulty principle.
 The Panel gave detailed reasons for denying the request
for an adjournment. In doing so, the Panel had to balance the
potential impact on Azeff and Bobrow, with the desire to proceed
with the hearing as scheduled. On that latter point, the Panel
observed that it had already taken four years to get the matter
to the current hearing date, and that the events in issue dated
back to 2004 and 2007. Delay was therefore a natural concern.
 In refusing the request for an adjournment, the Panel
noted the following pertinent facts:
( i) Azeff and Bobrow’s expert was not going to be a witness at
the hearing. Her role was strictly an advisory one to assist
counsel in his preparation of the case and with his cross-
examination of witnesses;
6 Senjule v. Law Society of Upper Canada,  O.J. No. 2347, 2013 ONSC
2817 (Div. Ct.), at para. 21.