( ii) the majority of the evidence to be called at the hearing was
to be fact evidence and it would be for the panel to determine what inferences may be drawn from the evidence presented by the parties;
( iii) Azeff and Bobrow were not precluded from bringing forward
additional documents nor were they precluded from giving
their own evidence and/or calling any witnesses;
( iv) a year earlier, Bobrow had been granted an adjournment
and the hearing was re-scheduled as a consequence;
( v) if an adjournment was granted, there was no guarantee that
the hearing could be rescheduled before September 2015.
 In the end result, the Panel concluded that the expert
was “sufficiently prepared” to provide the assistance to counsel
that she was retained to provide.
 It is also the case that, during the course of the hearing,
the Panel was alert to the concerns that Azeff and Bobrow continued to raise regarding this issue. Indeed, the Panel granted their
counsel an indulgence when it agreed to postpone for a week the
continued cross-examination of the respondent’s principal investigator to provide counsel with additional time to prepare.
 It is also of some importance in relation to this issue
that, notwithstanding the passage of time since the hearing was
completed, Azeff and Bobrow are still unable to point to any evidence, that their expert uncovered, that they were precluded
from advancing at the hearing. Azeff and Bobrow respond to this
point by saying that their expert did not continue working after
the hearing ended, because they did not know whether her
efforts would be accepted on the appeal.
 It seems to me that the argument advanced by Azeff and
Bobrow becomes somewhat circular at this point. Azeff and
Bobrow had the opportunity to provide concrete examples of
documents or witnesses, that might have affected the result of
the hearing, but were unavailable to them, because of the
refusal to grant an adjournment. They have not produced any
such evidence. It does not lie with them, in response, to suggest
that they did not have any obligation to pursue that evidence,
until they first obtained this court’s agreement that they were
prejudiced by what occurred.
 Finally on this point, the reliance by Azeff and Bobrow
on the decision in Kalin v. Ontario College of Teachers (2005),
75 O.R. (3d) 523,  O.J. No. 2097 (Div. Ct.) is misplaced.
There is no comparison between what the tribunal did in Kalin,