In rendering its decision on sanctions, the Panel noted
that both personal deterrence and general deterrence are
important objectives in reaching a decision on the appropriate
sanction. It also noted that the Act provides for administrative
penalties of up to $1 million per breach. At the same time, the
Panel was cognizant of the fact that punishment is not one of the
objectives of imposing sanctions.
 In approaching its task, the Panel also observed, at para.
10 [2015 LNONOSC 525]:
Sanctions have to be carefully tailored to the particular breaches of the
Act, the role of the perpetrator and the particular circumstances applicable
to each respondent. Prior decisions of this Commission, or of any other
regulator, must be considered, as we have done, to gain the wisdom from
peers. However, it would not be an appropriate exercise of our discretion to
slavishly follow prior sanctions decisions and make adjustments to them
based on the amount of profit garnered in these situations, or of the number
 Unlike the other appellants, Finkelstein was not a registrant. The Panel found, correctly in my view, that registrants,
because of their position, bear a higher degree of responsibility
for violations of the Act than non-registrants would. At the same
time, however, Finkelstein was a lawyer, working at a major law
firm, in the very area of law and commercial activity to which
the Act is directed. Finkelstein would, by the very nature of his
position, be privy to precisely the type of material non-public
information that the Act seeks to prohibit trading on. Finkelstein was, therefore, in a critical position in terms of his access
to such information and his ability to pass it along to others.
Consequently, the degree of responsibility that he should bear
for violations of the Act ought not to be appreciably different, in
terms of order of magnitude, than that imposed on registrants.
 The harm that is associated with the conduct that
Finkelstein engaged in is fundamentally at odds with the goal of
having a free and equal market, open to all investors. The goal is
to ensure that any investor can have confidence that the market
is not “rigged” in favour of some investors over others. As the
Panel said, at para. 13:
The passing of MNPI to a person not authorized to receive it strikes at the
core of fairness to all investors engaged in the market. Tipping of MNPI
undercuts one of the foundational pillars of the Act, namely confidence.
It provides an informational advantage to some market participants at the
expense of others.
 The Panel noted that, while Finkelstein may not have
personally benefitted from his conduct, the participants in
the three instances of insider trading/tipping earned profits of