I agree that proprietary charges for goods and services supplied in a commercial context are distinct from either regulatory charges or taxes and may
be determined by market forces.
 The appellant observes that the amount of managerial
discretion in commercial contexts falls along a spectrum and
advocated interpreting “commercial context” in Rothstein J.’s distinction to require the exercise of active management discretion on
a transaction-by-transaction basis. Such an interpretation is
required, he submits, to give meaning to the protection that s. 53
of the Constitution Act affords the public from indirect taxation.
 We are not persuaded that Rothstein J. intended that
“commercial context” be given such a restricted meaning. The
application judge found the LCBO was the owner and commercial supplier of the spirits in question. We agree with the application judge’s analysis and his conclusion that the markup is a
proprietary charge and not a tax.
 Furthermore, we agree with the application judge’s alternate conclusion that the markup is not a tax because the appellant agreed to it in its contract. It is well-established that
obligations under a contract arise from the voluntary agreement
of the parties, while the obligation to pay a tax does not. Under
the contract, the LCBO owns the spirits in the appellant’s store.
As owner of the goods, the LCBO must have the right to determine the prices for which they are sold, including the markup. It
follows that the markup is not an exercise of the government’s
public authority but of its private law rights.
 The appellant submits the application judge erred in finding
it is not under a “practical compulsion” to obtain authorization to
operate a retail store. We do acknowledge that, within the regula-
tory framework, this is the only way it can sell its products
directly to the public, albeit through a third party. However, that
requirement falls short of the restrictions discussed in Canadian
Industrial Gas & Oil Ltd. v. Saskatchewan,  2 S.C.R. 545,
 S.C.J. No. 124, where a petroleum royalty surcharge was
held to be a tax. We agree with the application judge’s observation
[at para. 46] that the applicant entered into a contract with the
LCBO for a commercial advantage and it was “clear that the ap-
plicant was not compelled to sell its products through its own
store. Like others, it could sell its spirits through stores operated
by the LCBO or, alternatively, to markets outside Canada.”
 The appeal is dismissed. The respondents’ costs are fixed
in the amount of $5,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, to
be paid to each of the three respondents.