The parallels between that case and the instant case are compelling:
— Both were motivated to provide intelligence for legitimate police
— Both were selective in the sense of targeting only “suspicious” members of the driving public and were, in that sense, not arbitrary;
— Both involved “plain view” assessments of the drivers, passengers,
vehicles and equipment; and
— Both were limited to the requirements of the HTA and did not
involve intrusive searches of persons and property.
The arguments on appeal
 The appellant says that what occurred here was an arbitrary detention. This was a pretext stop, not authorized by law.
The stop could not be justified, as the trial judge said, under
s. 216(1) of the HTA. Detective Ward acknowledged that his singular purpose was to further the criminal investigation of the
break-ins. He had no intention, much less basis, to investigate
any highway traffic or highway safety issues.
 The appellant calls to mind that s. 216(1) requires articulable cause, that is to say, a reason, legitimately connected to
highway safety concerns, for stopping a motorist. There was
here no basis to found a reasonable suspicion that the appellant
was violating any law pertaining to highway regulation and
safety, or that there were other more generalized safety concerns
about the vehicle he was operating. Section 216(1) cannot be
invoked to legitimize unauthorized stops or searches or arbitrary
 The decision in Brown v. Durham that the trial judge
found dispositive has no application. In Brown v. Durham,
unlike here, there were legitimate highway safety concerns,
in addition to criminal intelligence purposes. That there was a
“dual purpose” to the stops in Brown v. Durham did not make
them constitutionally invalid. But the evidence revealed but a
single purpose here, a purpose which had nothing to do with
s. 216(1). The trial judge’s finding to the contrary is unreasonable, and based on a misapprehension of Det. Ward’s evidence.
 The respondent resists any suggestion that the initial
detention of the appellant was arbitrary.
 The respondent says the police have authority to investigatively detain persons based on reasonable suspicion, that is
to say, reasonable suspicion of a nexus between the person who
is to be detained and a recent or ongoing criminal offence.
Here, there was a constellation of facts sufficient to ground