securing evidence of the offence for which the arrest has been
made: Caslake, at para. 22. A search incident to arrest may
include a search of an automobile of which the arrested person is
in possession, but the scope of that search will depend on several
factors: Caslake, at para. 23; Polashek, at paras. 25-26.
The principles applied
 Leaving until later consideration of the impact of the
arbitrary detention on the lawfulness of the arrest, I would not
give effect to either branch of this ground of appeal.
 Turning first to the lawfulness of the arrest, I am satisfied
that the trial judge reached the proper conclusion despite his consideration of two factors that appear to me to be irrelevant.
 The trial judge relied on several factors in concluding
that Det. Ward had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant:
( i) Detective Ward’s evidence that he smelled raw marijuana
when the appellant lowered the driver’s door window of
( ii) the specific attributes Det. Ward ascribed to the odour;
( iii) the experience of Det. Ward in drug, in particular, marijuana
( iv) the evidence of the officers assisting in the arrest that they
too smelled marijuana; and
( v) the appellant had refused to answer Det. Ward’s questions
about the contents of the boxes.
 The trial judge stated the statutory conditions precedent
to arrest without a warrant under s. 495(1)(b) of the Criminal
Code were met in this case. This paragraph, unlike s. 495(1)(a),
does not, in terms, require that the officer have reasonable
grounds to believe that a person has committed an indictable
offence. What is required is that the officer personally observe
facts or events that can support a reasonably grounded belief
that a person is presently committing the offence. Depending on
the circumstances, an odour of fresh or raw, as opposed to burnt
or smoked, marijuana, on its own, may be sufficient to ground
an arrest under s. 495(1)(b).
 In reaching this conclusion that the arrest was lawful,
the trial judge considered two factors that are irrelevant.
 The first, that the appellant failed to respond to
Det. Ward’s query about the content of the boxes, is problematic
because the appellant was under no obligation to answer that