“done whatever [he] could” to assist the removed Indian child
“to re-connect with his or her family or learn about their First
Nations identity”. I required more specificity.
 I therefore directed a mini-trial under rule 20.04(2.2) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 for the pur-
poses of clarification22 and ordered that the representative
plaintiff present oral evidence on the following issue:
If Canada had consulted with Indian Bands (as per s. 2(2) of the 1965
Agreement) what ideas or advice would have been provided that could have
prevented the Indian children who had been removed and placed in non-
Aboriginal foster or adoptive homes from losing their Aboriginal identity?
 The plaintiff filed two brief affidavits for the mini-trial:
one from Wilmer Nadjiwon, who had been the chief of the Chippewas Nawash from 1964 to 1978, and the other from Howard
Jones, who had been a band councillor on the same reserve over
some 15 years beginning in 1965. Upon receiving the affidavits,
Canada advised that it would not cross-examine and that the
two affidavits could stand as the oral testimony. As a result, it
was agreed that there was no need for the formal mini-trial.
 The uncontroverted evidence of Mr. Nadjiwon and Mr.
Jones was that if they had been consulted they would have suggested that some contact be maintained with the removed children during the post-placement period so that they would know
that they were loved and “could always come home”; and that
the “white care-givers” be provided with information about the
removed child’s Indian band, culture and traditions and the various federal educational and financial benefits that were available to the Indian children.
 There is no reason to believe that similar ideas would
not have been provided by other Indian bands had they been consulted and Canada has not adduced any evidence to the contrary.
 If these ideas and suggestions had been implemented as
part of the extension of the provincial child welfare regime —
that is, if the foster or adoptive parents had been provided with
information about the aboriginal child’s heritage and the federal
22 Hryniak v. Mauldin,  1 S.C.R. 87,  S.C.J. No. 7, at para. 51:
“. . . concerns about credibility or clarification of the evidence can be
addressed by calling oral evidence on the [summary judgment] motion itself”
(emphasis added). I am satisfied that my proposed use of a mini-trial to clarify the evidence in question falls squarely within the Supreme Court’s decision in Hryniak and within the letter and spirit of rule 20.04(2.2). See
my decision as the summary judgment judge in Combined Air Mechanical
Services Inc. v. Flesch,  O.J. No. 1377, 2010 ONSC 1729 (S.C.J.),
at para. 38, confirmed on appeal, sub nom. Hryniak v. Mauldin.