testified consistently about the essential parts of the allegation, and the record
did not establish that she was unable or unwilling to give a full account of events
or could not recall significant details.
Prior consistent statements are presumptively inadmissible because they lack
probative value. One exception to the basic rule is the narrative as circumstantial
evidence exception. In appropriate cases, prior consistent statements can be useful tools in assisting the trier of fact to assess the truthfulness or reliability of the
declarant. Given the circumstances in which the complainant made her statement in this case, the trial judge did not err in admitting the statement under
the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception. He did not use the statement
for the prohibited inference that consistence enhances credibility, or draw the
incorrect conclusion that the simple making of a prior consistent statement corroborates in-court testimony. Rather, he used the prior consistent statement for
the permissible purpose of evaluating the context in which the initial complaint
arose, in particular the fact and timing of the complaint and the spontaneous
way in which it came out, in assessing the truthfulness of the complainant’s
Per Doherty J.A. (concurring): The admissibility of a prior consistent statement, like the admissibility of other forms of evidence, turns on the relevance,
materiality and probative value of the evidence. When a prior consistent statement is tendered, the admissibility inquiry should focus on those broader considerations rather than the technicalities of established exceptions. When a party
tenders a prior consistent statement, the court must first determine the purpose
for which that evidence is tendered. If the evidence is tendered for its truth, the
evidence must qualify for admissibility under the controlling hearsay principles.
If the prior consistent statement is not offered for the truth of its consents, the
purpose for which it is offered must have relevance to a material issue in the proceeding. Once the purpose for offering the evidence is identified, the party tendering the evidence must show that it has some probative value in respect of
the purpose for which it is offered. In this case, the evidence of the complainant’s
interaction with the police at the station, including her statement, was relevant
to a proper assessment of her credibility. It was therefore admissible even if it
was a prior consistent statement.
R. v. C. (G.),  O.J. No. 2245, 71 W.C.B. (2d) 257 (C.A.); R. v. Mackenzie,
 O.J. No. 575, 2015 ONCA 93, 19 C.R. (7th) 150, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 128,
Other cases referred to
R. v. C. (M.),  O.J. No. 3959, 2014 ONCA 611, 314 C.C.C. (3d) 336,
325 O.A.C. 1, 13 C.R. (7th) 396, 115 W.C.B. (2d) 585; R. v. Curto,  O.J.
No. 889, 2008 ONCA 161, 230 C.C.C. (3d) 145, 234 O.A.C. 238, 54 C.R. (6th) 237,
77 W.C.B. (2d) 143 (C.A.); R. v. Dakin,  O.J. No. 944, 80 O.A.C. 253,
27 W.C.B. (2d) 16 (C.A.); R. v. Dinardo,  1 S.C.R. 788,  S.C.J. No. 24,
2008 SCC 24, EYB 2008-133045, J.E. 2008-1022, 374 N.R. 198, 231 C.C.C. (3d)
177, 293 D.L.R. (4th) 375, 57 C.R. (6th) 48, 77 W.C.B. (2d) 514; R. v. Evans,
 2 S.C.R. 629,  S.C.J. No. 30, 104 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 153 N.R. 212, J.E.
93-1204, 28 B.C.A.C. 81, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 338, 21 C.R. (4th) 321, 20 W.C.B. (2d) 130;
R. v. F. (J.E.) (1993), 16 O.R. (3d) 1,  O.J. No. 2589, 67 O.A.C. 251,
85 C.C.C. (3d) 457, 26 C.R. (4th) 220, 21 W.C.B. (2d) 382 (C.A.); R. v. Khan, 
2 S.C.R. 531,  S.C.J. No. 81, 113 N.R. 53, J.E. 90-1356, 41 O.A.C. 353,
59 C.C.C. (3d) 92, 79 C.R. (3d) 1, 11 W.C.B. (2d) 10, affg  O.J. No. 578,
27 O.A.C. 142, 42 C.C.C. (3d) 197, 64 C.R. (3d) 281, 5 W.C.B. (2d) 54 (C.A.);
R. v. M. (R.E.),  3 S.C.R. 3,  S.C.J. No. 52, 2008 SCC 51, 235 C.C.C.