On appeal to the summary conviction appeal court, Vallee J.
held that the trial judge erred in finding the prior consistent
statement was admissible under the principled approach to the
hearsay rule, as it was not “necessary” because the complainant
testified at trial. Vallee J. also concluded that the trial judge
erred in using the prior consistent statement for the truth of its
content and, further, that he used the statement for the impermissible purpose of inferring truth from repetition. She referenced the trial judge’s language that the prior consistent
statement showed [at para. 15] “the consistency of [the com-plainant’s] complaint” and that “it assisted the court in determining the overall credibility in a positive way”. Vallee J.
quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.
III. Parties’ Positions
 The Crown argues that the trial judge used the prior consistent statement for a proper and restrained purpose. The spontaneous nature of the initial complaint, and the complainant’s
repetition of the essential elements of the allegations, provided
important context in which to assess the complainant’s credibility. The trial judge’s reasons as a whole reflect a proper use of
the statement, having regard to the circumstances in which it
came out. In this case, the trial judge concluded that the circumstances surrounding the initial complaint impacted on the complainant’s credibility in a positive way.
 The Crown also seeks to have this court reconsider its
endorsement in R. v. Mackenzie,  O.J. No. 575, 2015
ONCA 93, 19 C.R. (7th) 150. The Crown’s concern is that
Mackenzie could be interpreted as standing for the proposition
that where a statement is admitted under the res gestae
exception to the hearsay rule, but is also a prior consistent statement,
it cannot be relied upon for the truth of its contents. In response
to a request made by the Crown, the chief justice struck a five-judge panel.
 The respondent argues that the trial judge relied heavily
on the truth of the complainant’s prior consistent statement that
she had already been searched three times, when that statement
was not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, or under
the principled approach to the hearsay rule. The respondent further argues that the statement was not admissible pursuant to
any recognized exception to the general rule that prior consistent statements are inadmissible. The respondent submits
that the summary conviction appeal court correctly quashed
the conviction. Further, the respondent submits that the trial