element. Where admissible, the declaration element is proof that
a statement was made, and allows a trier of fact to derive appropriate inferences from the fact and context in which the statement was made: Paciocco, at p. 184.
 The common law recognizes a number of exceptions to the
basic rule that prior consistent statements are inadmissible.
When a prior consistent statement is admissible pursuant to one
of these exceptions, it is admissible for limited purposes, and
those purposes differ among exceptions.
 For example, where a prior consistent statement is admitted to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, it is admitted
solely to provide a direct response to the suggestion that the
witness concocted allegations after a triggering event. The
statement is not admitted for the truth of its contents, but only
to show that the details were not added after the point in time
suggested by opposing counsel.
 Other recognized exceptions include admitting prior consistent statements as pure narrative evidence, and narrative as
circumstantial evidence: Paciocco, at p. 182.
 As pure narrative, prior consistent statements carry no
weight because they are tendered simply to give the background
to explain how the complaint came to be before the court. This
court described the pure narrative exception in R. v. F. (J.E.)
(1993), 16 O.R. (3d) 1,  O.J. No. 2589 (C.A.), as allowing
the decision maker to understand the “chronological cohesion” of
the case. The statement is not used to prove the truth of its contents, nor are there any inferences arising that would make the
case of one person more compelling than that of another. It is
merely an aid in understanding the case as a whole.
 But sometimes the circumstances surrounding the making of the prior consistent statement are such that the statement
assists in assessing the reliability and credibility of a witness’
in-court testimony, giving prior consistent statements admitted
as “narrative” a more substantive use: R. v. Dinardo, 
1 S.C.R. 788,  S.C.J. No. 24, 2008 SCC 24, at para. 39;
R. v. Evans,  2 S.C.R. 629,  S.C.J. No. 30, at
para. 32. This is referred to as narrative as circumstantial
 In R. v. C. (G.),  O.J. No. 2245, 2006 CarswellOnt
3413 (C.A.), at para. 22, Rouleau J.A. identified the limited way
in which prior consistent statements can be used to assist the
trier of fact in assessing the cogency, and therefore the reliability
and credibility, of a witness:
In cases involving sexual assault of young children, the courts recognize
the difficulty in the victim providing a full account of events. In appropriate