are the beneficiaries of the litigation, so it makes good sense that
the individual litigant should not bear the costs of the litigation:
R. v. Trask,  2 S.C.R. 304,  S.C.J. No. 58. That is not
this case. This judgment applies well-established legal principles
to the facts of this case. Consequently, this is not one of those
very rare cases where a costs award is appropriate.
 I would grant leave to the Crown to appeal, allow the appeal,
restore the conviction entered at trial and remit the sentence
appeal to the summary conviction appeal court for determination.
 DOHERTY J.A. (concurring): — I agree with Justice Hourigan’s proposed disposition of the appeal. I write separately to
outline the approach I suggest should be taken in determining
the admissibility of a prior consistent statement.
 The admissibility of prior consistent statements is governed by what I would describe as the traditional common law
model. We are told that prior consistent statements are presumptively inadmissible subject to a series of discrete exceptions. Admissibility depends on whether the proffered evidence
fits into any of the pre-existing exceptions. This approach, once
common to most evidentiary rules, most notably the rules governing hearsay evidence, has to a large extent been abandoned
in favour of a principled-based approach to admissibility.
 The admissibility of a prior consistent statement, like the
admissibility of other forms of evidence, turns on the relevance,
materiality and probative value of the evidence.1 When a prior
consistent statement is tendered, the admissibility inquiry
should focus on these broader considerations rather than the
technicalities of established exceptions. This change in focus
would not produce any significant change in the circumstances
in which the prior statement would be admitted. The existing
exceptions are to a large extent a product of the application of
the broader principles underlying the admissibility of evidence.
An approach which looks to broader principles would, however,
require counsel and the trial judge to come to grips with the
1 There are exclusionary rules that have nothing to do with the relevance and
materiality of the proffered evidence, e.g., claims based on privilege. All evidence tendered by the Crown is also subject to an overriding authority to
exclude Crown evidence where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative
value. The approach I outline is not intended to undercut any of these exclusionary rules. For my present purposes, I assume none apply here.