Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. N.1, s. 8 [rep.]
Professional Engineers Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.28, s. 46(1) [rep. S.O. 2002, c. 24,
Sch. B, s. 25]
APPEAL from an order dismissing a motion for summary
No one appearing for plaintiffs.
Iain Peck, for defendant/respondent David Weidberg.
John A. Little, for third parties/appellants Stan P. Makow and
Makow Associates Architect Inc.
The judgment of the court was delivered by
LABROSSE J.: —
 This is an appeal, with leave, of Dow J.’s order dated May
25, 2016 [ O.J. No. 2684, 2016 ONSC 2525 (S.C.J.)] dismissing the appellants’ motion for summary judgment.
 The appellants had sought to have the third party claim
brought against them by the respondent David Weidberg dismissed by way of motion for summary judgment. They argued
that their contract with the plaintiffs in this action protects
them from liability to either the plaintiffs or a third party by
way of contribution. The appellants seek an order setting aside
the decision of Dow J. and dismissing the respondent’s third
party claim against the appellants. The other parties to this
matter have not participated in the appeal.
 This appeal relates to the very specific issue of determining
if s. 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B (the
“Limitations Act”) supersedes the law in Giffels Associates Ltd. v.
Eastern Construction Co.,  2 S.C.R. 1346,  S.C.J.
No. 61, which supports the principle that a contractual limitation
provision can preclude a claim for contribution and indemnity.
 The factual history of this matter is very straightforward.
In 1993, Jack and Anne Weinbaum entered into an agreement
with Makow Associates Architect Inc. (“Makow Architects”)
to provide certain architectural services with respect to the
design and construction of the Weinbaum’s residence (the “
 The architectural agreement provided for a six-year limitation period after substantial performance for all claims relating to
“substantial performance of work”. The architectural agreement