contribution and indemnity, whether in tort or otherwise, now
has a two-year limitation period that is presumed to run
from the date when the person who seeks contribution and
indemnity is served with the plaintiff’s claim that gives rise to
its claim over”.
 It is this finding that is the subject of this appeal.
 The motion judge also went on to deal with the second
issue where he concluded that the protection afforded to the protected party would also extend to the principal of the protected
party as one of its employees/architects who did the actual work
(and likely an officer and director). This finding has not been
Standard of Review
 The parties are in agreement that the proper standard of
review on this question of law is correctness: see Housen v. Nikolaisen,  2 S.C.R. 235,  S.C.J. No. 31, 2002 SCC 33, at
paras. 8 and 9.
 The analysis of the relevant issues begins with the Court
of Appeal’s decision in Waterloo and how Feldman J.A. determined that s. 18 of the Limitations Act was the only limitation
period in the Limitations Act which applies to claims for contribution and indemnity. As such, there is a two-year limitation
period which begins to run from the date when the person who
seeks contribution and indemnity is served with the plaintiff’s
claim that gives rise to its claim over.
 However, the Court of Appeal in Waterloo was dealing
with a statutory limitation period, being s. 46(1) of the Profes-
sional Engineers Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.28. At para. 6 of her deci-
sion, Feldman J.A. identifies the relevant issue as being:
Can a cross-claim for contribution and indemnity exist when the person
from whom contribution is sought is no longer liable in law to the plaintiff
because the plaintiff’s claim against that person is statute barred Or is it
sufficient that that person was potentially liable to the plaintiff at one time?
 The analysis in Waterloo is then contrasted with the law
set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Giffels. It is relevant
to note that Feldman J.A. did not refer to Giffels or its principles
in her decision.
 The law set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Giffels was properly summarized by the motion judge, where he
stated [at para. 8]: