a particular tortfeasor). The new limitation period under s. 18 applies, as
did the former one under s. 8, both to claims that are tried and to those that
are settled (ss. 1 and 2 of the Negligence Act).
 Feldman J.A. concludes her analysis by recognizing that
the effect of the new provision is that the period for bringing the
claim for contribution and indemnity now coincides much more
closely with the basic limitation for bringing all actions. This in
my view is a key component to the analysis of the Court of
Appeal in Waterloo: being the objective to end the confusion
that historically had existed with the various statutory limitation periods.
 However, the present case brings in a very different consideration: the right of parties to determine their affairs by way
of contract. This was acknowledged by the Supreme Court of
Canada in BG Checo International Ltd. v. British Columbia
Hydro and Power Authority,  1 S.C.R. 12,  S.C.J.
No. 1, at paras. 15 and 16, where the right of parties to determine the extent of their liability to one another was clearly recognized as being “of great importance in preserving a sphere of
individual liberty and commercial flexibility”.
 Further, I note that the principles established in Giffels
were established by the Supreme Court of Canada well after the
adoption of s. 8 of the Negligence Act. The parties to this appeal
agree that s. 18 of the Limitations Act has the same effect as s. 8
of the Negligence Act with the main difference being a change in
procedure to the starting point and duration of the claim for con-
tribution and indemnity. While this may be so practically, Feld-
man J.A. [in Waterloo] did summarize the effect of s. 18 of the
Limitations Act as follows [at para. 16]:
The new section did three things: (1) it made the claim for contribution
and indemnity an action that could be brought in separate proceedings after
judgment against, or settlement by, a tortfeasor in the main action; (2) it
enacted a one-year limitation period, subject to certain conditions; and (3)
it allowed the contribution claim to be brought notwithstanding the passage
of the limitation period that would have applied to a claim by the plaintiff
against the other tortfeasor, had one been brought.
 The scope of s. 18 of the Limitations Act was also considered by the Court of Appeal in Canaccord Capital Corp. v. Roscoe (2013), 115 O.R. (3d) 641,  O.J. No. 2643, 2013 ONCA
378. In Canaccord, Sharpe J.A. highlighted a further difference
where s. 8 of the Negligence Act previously referred to a “
tortfeaser” and that s. 18 of the Limitations Act now refers to
a “wrongdoer”. This was significant in Canaccord as the issue
was whether s. 18 and the two-year limitation period in the