a definition adopted in an earlier case, R. v. Richards,  O.J.
No. 1420, 26 C.R. (5th) 286, 120 O.A.C. 344 (C.A.), at p. 295 C.R.),
the Ontario Court of Appeal describes racial profiling as follows:
Racial profiling is criminal profiling based on race. Racial or colour profiling
refers to the phenomenon whereby certain criminal activity is attributed to
an identified group in society on the basis of race or colour resulting in the
targeting of individual members of that group. In this context, race is illegit-
imately used as a proxy for the criminality or general criminal propensity of
an entire racial group.
 The court in Brown also notes, at paras. 8-9, that the attitudes underlying racial profiling can be consciously or unconsciously held and that social science research establishes that
racialized characteristics of black people provoke police suspicion in Toronto.
 The court goes on to find that racial profiling can rarely
be proven by direct evidence, as “[t]his would involve an admission by a police officer that he or she was influenced by racial
stereotypes in the exercise of his or her discretion. . . . Accordingly, if racial profiling is to be proven it must be done by inference
drawn from the circumstantial evidence” (Brown, at para. 44).
 Further, “where the evidence shows that the circumstances relating to a detention correspond to the phenomenon of
racial profiling and provide a basis for the court to infer that the
police officer is lying about why he or she singled out the accused
for attention, the record is then capable of supporting a finding
that the stop was based on racial profiling” (Brown, at para. 45).
 In this case, the trial judge found that there was no reasonable basis for the police to suspect the appellant of criminal
behaviour. As put by him, at para. 72 of his decision, “[t]here was
no reason for Constable Pak to have a ‘hunch’ about bail or sentencing conditions and none for Constable Poole to have a concern about weapons”.
 The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the fact
that both officers, without any reasonable basis, suspected the
appellant of criminal behaviour is that their views of the appellant were coloured by the fact that he was black and by their
unconscious or conscious beliefs that black men have a propensity for criminal behaviour. This is the essence of racial profiling.
 In this case, the officers’ unreasonable beliefs about the
appellant caused them to assault the appellant, unreasonably
search him and forcibly restrain him. In other words, instead of
presuming his innocence, they assumed and acted as if he were
guilty and dangerous. He must be violating his bail and he must
be carrying a gun. These assumptions, for which there is no
explanation other than the colour of the appellant’s skin, caused